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VOLUME 60 WINTER 2007 NUMBER 4
OKLAHOMA
LAW REVIEW
DIFFERENCES WITHOUT DISTINCTIONS: BOYLE’S
GOVERNMENT CONTRACTOR DEFENSE FAILS TO
RECOGNIZE THE CRITICAL DIFFERENCES
BETWEEN CIVILIAN AND MILITARY PLAINTIFFS




It has been said that the Founding Fathers created a “fighting
[C]onstitution.”   The Preamble expressly provides that one of the1
Constitution’s purposes is to “provide for the common defence [sic].”  2
While the Constitution grants Congress and the Executive clear powers for
achieving this purpose,  the judiciary is given little or no role.   In3 4
recognition of this express constitutional grant of authority, the judiciary has
afforded unparalleled deference to congressional and executive action in
military matters.   On many occasions, the Supreme Court has recognized5
* Assistant Professor, Barry University, Dwayne O. Andreas School of Law; J.D.,
Harvard Law School, cum laude, 1996; B.A., University of Maryland, summa cum laude, 1992. 
The author would like to thank the U.S. Marine Corps for teaching him the value of discipline
and duty while the author served as a rifleman from 1984 to 1988.  The author would also like
to recognize the hard work and patience of his research assistant, Jane M. Goddard, whose aid
was crucial to the completion of this article. 
1. Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742, 782 (1948) (quoting Honorable Charles E.
Hughes, War Powers Under the Constitution, Address Before the American Bar Association
(Sept. 5, 1917), in 42 A.B.A. REP. 232, 248 (1917)). 
2. U.S. CONST. pmbl. 
3. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 1, 11, 12, 13, 15, 16; U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. 
4. See Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 300-01 (1983). 
5. See, e.g., id. at 301; Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 510 (1975); see also Earl F.
Martin, Separating United States Service Members from the Bill of Rights, 54 SYRACUSE L.
647
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that it is the primary business of the military to prepare for and fight wars6
and that the judiciary is simply not constitutionally empowered or competent
to second-guess military matters.  7
Soldiers and civilians are also different.  Military society is
constitutionally distinct from civilian society.   Military society requires a8
level of obedience, duty, and self-sacrifice not found in civilian life.   Many9
legal distinctions between servicemembers and civilians are justified by
these fundamental differences and by the overriding demands of military
discipline.  For example, while civilians may bring claims against the United
States for damages they suffer as a result of government negligence,  the10
Feres doctrine precludes servicemembers’ suits where their injuries arise
incident to their military service.   Similarly, in Bivens v. Six Unknown11
Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics,  the Supreme Court held12
that civilians may seek damages from the federal officials who violate their
constitutional rights.   Bivens claims by servicemembers, however, are13
barred if the constitutional violation occurred incident to their military
service.   In both instances, the Court justified different rules for civilians14
and servicemembers because of the constitutional allocation of military
control to the political branches of government and the detrimental effects
such suits might have on military discipline.  15
REV. 599 (2004) (discussing development of “separate community doctrine,” whereby the
Supreme Court has interpreted constitutional allocation of military matters to political branches
of government as requiring tremendous deference by the judiciary).
6. United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 17 (1955). 
7. E.g., Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 10 (1973). 
8. See, e.g., Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435, 450-51 (1987) (upholding court-
martial jurisdiction, without Fifth Amendment’s right to grand jury and Sixth Amendment’s jury
trial requirement, over armed services members at time of offense charged, even where crime
has no connection to military service); Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 756 (1974) (holding that
fundamental necessity of obedience and discipline may render speech protected in the civil
population unprotected in the military); Martin, supra note 5 (discussing Supreme Court
jurisprudence in “separate community doctrine,” whereby judiciary has been scrupulous not to
interfere in military matters constitutionally allocated to political branches of government); see
also Barry Kellman, Judicial Abdication of Military Tort Accountability: But Who Is to Guard
the Guards Themselves?, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1597 (maintaining that Rehnquist Court has abdicated
its responsibility to review civil claims involving military matters). 
9. Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. 738, 757 (1975).
10. Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (2000).
11. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950). 
12. 403 U.S. 388 (1971). 
13. Id. at 392. 
14. United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669 (1987); Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296
(1983).
15. See infra Part IV.D.1.
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Likewise, the lower federal courts developed a federal common law
defense, the “government contractor defense,”  that barred state law design16
defect claims by servicemembers injured incident to service against military
equipment manufacturers, provided that the design conformed to reasonably
precise specifications approved by the United States.   The defense was17
based upon the Feres doctrine and was justified for many of the same
reasons.  Paramount among these justifications were concerns that resolution
of such suits would necessarily require the second-guessing of military
16. The courts have not been entirely uniform in their identification of the defense.  Various
courts have referred to the defense as the “military contractors’ defense,” e.g., Sharkey v. United
States, 17 Cl. Ct. 643 (Cl. Ct. 1989), the “government contractor defense,” e.g., Hercules Inc.
v. United States, 516 U.S. 417 (1996), the “government contractor’s defense,” e.g., Butler v.
Ingalls Shipbuilding, Inc., 89 F.3d 582 (1996), and the “government contractors’ defense,” e.g.,
Fisher v. Halliburton, 390 F. Supp. 2d 610 (S.D. Tex. 2005).  For the sake of clarity, this article
refers to the defense as the “government contractor defense” except when discussing the
proposed new defense limited to claims by servicemembers injured incident to service.  That
defense will be referred to as the “military contractor defense,” as that term more accurately
describes the parameters of the proposed defense.
17. See In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1987) (defoliant);
Tozer v. LTV Corp., 792 F.2d 403 (4th Cir. 1986) (reconnaissance aircraft); Shaw v. Grumman
Aerospace Corp., 778 F.2d 736 (11th Cir. 1985) (carrier-launched aircraft); Bynum v. FMC
Corp., 770 F.2d 556 (5th Cir. 1985) (tracked Army vehicle); In re Air Crash Disaster at
Mannheim Germany, 769 F.2d 115 (3d Cir. 1985) (Army helicopter); Tillett v. J.I. Case Co.,
756 F.2d 591 (7th Cir. 1985) (front-end loader); McKay v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 704 F.2d 444
(9th Cir. 1983) (naval aircraft); Casabianca v. Casabianca, 428 N.Y.S.2d 400 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1980) (dough-mixing machine). 
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decisions and that such suits might have a detrimental effect on military
discipline.  18
Nevertheless, when the Supreme Court addressed the government
contractor defense in Boyle v. United Technologies Corp.,  it rejected the19
appellate court’s assertion that the Feres doctrine was the source of the
unique federal interest justifying the creation of the federal common law
defense.   Instead, the Boyle Court based the government contractor defense20
on the discretionary function exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act
(FTCA).   Under the discretionary function exception to the FTCA,21
Congress refused to waive the sovereign immunity of the United States for
government decisions grounded in social, economic, or political policy.  22
The Court reasoned that allowing state law products liability design defects
claims would result in the United States indirectly paying the liability
costs—in the form of higher prices—and that this would impermissibly
interfere with the discretion of government officials.  23
The Boyle Court’s focus on the effect the “financial burden” of products
liability judgments might have upon government discretion in procurement,
rather than on avoiding judicial interference in military matters and military
discipline, removed the government contractor defense from its military
foundation and necessarily broadened the scope of the defense.  Suits by
both civilians and servicemembers have the potential to increase the
financial burden on the procurement of military equipment.  Accordingly,
Boyle’s government contractor defense, based upon the discretionary
function exception to the FTCA, necessarily bars claims brought by soldiers
and civilians alike.   24
In addition, lower federal courts disagree as to the proper scope of the
discretionary function-based defense.  If protecting government discretion
is the focus of the defense, then it is not logically limited to design defects
18. E.g., Shaw, 778 F.2d at 742 (stating that military must be free to decide risks of injury
to servicemen from equipment designs it orders without judicial interference); Bynum, 770 F.2d
at 565 (asserting that litigation involving defective designs in military products, whether against
government or contractor, would allow servicemembers to “question military decisions and
obtain relief from actions of military officials”); McKay, 704 F.2d at 449 (holding military
suppliers liable for defective designs approved by United States would thrust judiciary into
making military decisions).
19. 487 U.S. 500 (1988).
20. Id. at 501.
21. Id. 
22. United States v. Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. 797, 814 (1984) (discussing legislative history
of the FTCA).
23. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 511-12. 
24. Id.
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol60/iss4/1
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specifically approved by the government  but should apply to all25
procurement decisions grounded in social, economic, or political policy. 
Similarly, there is a split in the courts as to whether the defense applies only
to military procurement  or to all government procurement, including non-26
military products procured for non-military use.   Numerous cases and27
commentators have been critical of the ever-expanding scope of the
government contractor defense under Boyle.   At some point, the Supreme28
Court will have to resolve the disputes in the lower courts as to the scope of
the defense.
This article asserts that the Supreme Court erred when it abandoned the
Feres-based rationale for the government contractor defense, and proposes
25. Compare Mitchell v. Lone Star Ammunition, Inc., 913 F.2d 242, 245 (5th Cir. 1990)
(determining defense applies only to design defect claims), with Snell v. Bell Helicopter
Textron, Inc., 107 F.3d 744, 749 (9th Cir. 1997) (applying defense to manufacturing defect
claim), Oliver v. Oshkosh Truck Corp., 96 F.3d 992, 1003 (7th Cir. 1996) (applying defense to
warnings defect claim), and Bentzlin v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 833 F. Supp. 1486, 1489 (C.D.
Cal. 1993) (applying defense to manufacturing defect claim).
26. In re Haw. Fed. Asbestos Cases, 960 F.2d 806, 812 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding defense
not applicable to commercially available products but is limited to specialized military
equipment); Nielsen v. George Diamond Vogel Paint Co., 892 F.2d 1450, 1453-55 (9th Cir.
1990) (stating defense does not apply to non-military products). 
27. Carley v. Wheeled Coach, 991 F.2d 1117, 1119 (3d Cir. 1993) (defective ambulance
design); Adorno v. Corr. Servs. Corp., 312 F. Supp. 2d 505, 521 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (assuming
defense would apply in non-military context but finding it did not apply for other reasons);
Yeroshefsky v. Unisys Corp., 962 F. Supp. 710, 717 (D. Md. 1997) (U.S. Post Office letter
sorting machine); Fagans v. Unisys Corp., 945 F. Supp. 3, 6 n.3 (D.D.C. 1996) (U.S. Post
Office letter sorting machine); Andrew v. Unisys Corp., 936 F. Supp. 821 (W.D. Okla. 1996)
(U.S. Post Office letter sorting machine); Wisner v. Unisys Corp., 917 F. Supp. 1501, 1509-10
(D. Kan. 1996) (U.S. Post Office letter sorting machine); Guillory v. Ree’s Contract Serv., Inc.,
872 F. Supp. 344, 346 (S.D. Miss. 1994) (applying defense to claim against security company
for negligent performance of security contract for federal building where plaintiff was
assaulted); Richland-Lexington Airport Dist. v. Atlas Props., Inc., 854 F. Supp. 400, 422
(D.S.C. 1994) (applying defense to preclude claim for negligent performance of contract with
EPA to excavate, remove, and stockpile contaminated soil); Johnson v. Grumman Corp., 806
F. Supp. 212, 217-18 (W.D. Wis. 1992) (postal vehicle); In re Chateaugay Corp., 132 B.R. 818,
827 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1991) (postal vehicle); Silverstein v. Northrop Grumman Corp., 842 A.2d
881 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004) (postal vehicle); see also Sean Watts, Note, Boyle v.
United Technologies Corp. and the Government Contractor Defense: An Analysis Based on the
Current Circuit Split Regarding the Scope of the Defense, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 687 (1999)
(discussing circuit split and concluding that Congress should resolve existing confusion by
crafting comprehensive government contractor defense). 
28. See Michael D. Green & Richard A. Matasar, The Supreme Court and the Products
Liability Crisis: Lessons from Boyle’s Government Contractor Defense, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 637,
698 (1990). 
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a “military contractor defense” designed principally to protect federal
interests in military procurement and in the unique demands of military
discipline.  Mooring the defense to a military-centered rationale would
provide a clear and logical scope to its application and would eliminate the
current division between the courts.  The military contractor defense,
tailored to protect both the constitutional allocation of military matters to the
political branches of government and the demands of military discipline,
is—to borrow the Court’s own terminology from Boyle—simultaneously
narrower and broader than Boyle’s government contractor defense.  It is
narrower because it would apply only to claims brought by servicemembers
injured incident to their service and not to claims brought by injured
civilians.  It is broader because it is not limited to design defect claims
where the government has approved the design feature at issue in the suit. 
Nor is the defense limited to specialized military equipment; rather, it
applies to all militarily procured products.  The military contractor defense
precludes all products liability claims against defense contractors brought
by servicemembers injured incident to service.  The expansion is justified
by the same rationale used by the Court to bar Bivens claims by
servicemembers and negligence claims under the Feres doctrine: Military
discipline is compromised when servicemembers are permitted to question
the judgment, orders, and actions of fellow servicemembers, military
superiors, and the political branches of the government charged with
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol60/iss4/1
2007] BOYLE’S GOVERNMENT CONTRACTOR DEFENSE 653
equipping and running the military.  29
Part II of this article traces the origins and development of the government
contractor defense prior to the Court’s decision in Boyle.  Specifically, Part
II examines the critical role concerns for separation of powers in military
matters and military discipline played in the development of the defense. 
Beginning with the Feres decision, it follows the circuitous path of Supreme
Court jurisprudence from its ill-explained beginnings in Feres to its later
rationales of separation of powers and military discipline.  It then follows
the lower courts’ application of the Feres doctrine and rationales to bar
servicemembers’ design defect claims against independent contractors
producing military equipment.  Part II pays particular attention to how a lack
of clarity in Feres may have resulted in its rejection by the Court in Boyle. 
Part III examines the Court’s decision in Boyle and its deliberate
foundational shift from a Feres-based deference in military matters to a
broader discretionary function exception to the FTCA.  The Court justified
the shift as necessary to protect government discretion from the impact
contractor liability could have upon the cost and availability of products the
government needs.  The focus on fiscal concerns and their impact on
government discretion has produced conflicting interpretations as to the
scope of the defense.  Part III also provides a critical evaluation of the
government contractor defense under the Boyle formulation, which is neither
logically limited to military procurement, nor logically limited to design
defects resulting from reasonably precise government specifications required
by or approved by the government. 
Part IV proposes an alternative federal common law military contractor
defense that reunites the defense to its military foundation and recognizes
the important differences between military and non-military government
procurement and between civilian and military plaintiffs.  After setting out
the military contractor defense, Part IV explains its basis in the
constitutional separation of powers and the federal interest of military
discipline.  The defense would displace state tort law only where the distinct
federal interests of separation of powers in military matters and military
discipline are most implicated.  The proposed rule is broader than the Boyle
government contractor defense in that it precludes all suits by
servicemembers against military contractors based upon state products
liability law.  This broad preclusion serves separation of powers principles
and protects military discipline even where the narrow discretionary design
judgments protected by the Boyle test are not implicated.  The rule is also
29. United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 683-84 (1987); Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S.
296, 300 (1983).
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narrower than the Boyle government contractor defense in that it would not
apply to civilian suits against government contractors because military
discipline is not directly affected in these cases.  The narrower rule
recognizes that civilians, unlike servicemembers, are not compensated by
military or veterans’ benefits for their injuries and do not voluntarily assume
the risks of injuries associated with the use of military equipment.  By
adopting the military contractor defense, the Supreme Court would provide
the lower courts with a clear and logical doctrine, grounded upon
distinctions long recognized by the Court.
II. The Military Origins of the Government Contractor Defense
Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Boyle, the government contractor
defense had been firmly limited to suits by servicemembers involving claims
related to military procurement because the defense was based upon the
same federal interests supporting the Feres doctrine.  Unfortunately, the
Court’s decision in Feres has been justifiably subject to wide criticism and
misunderstanding.   Much of the misunderstanding results from the Court’s30
failure to articulate military discipline as the primary rationale for the
doctrine until some forty years after the Feres decision.   In order to31
understand the pre-Boyle government contractor defense cases and the
Court’s rejection of Feres as the basis for the government contractor defense
in Boyle, we must thoroughly understand the origin and evolution of Feres
and its progeny.
A. The Development of the Feres Doctrine as a Bar to Claims Against the
Government
30. See Hinkie v. United States, 715 F.2d 96, 98 (3d Cir. 1983) (reluctantly following Feres
while referring to its doctrine as “unfair”); In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 580 F. Supp.
1242, 1246-47 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) (listing cases and commentators critical of Feres); Barry
Bennett, The Feres Doctrine, Discipline, and the Weapons of War, 29 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 383
(1984). 
31. United States v. Johnson, 481 U.S. 681, 690-91 (1987) (citing United States v. Shearer,
473 U.S. 52, 59 (1985)). 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol60/iss4/1
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In Feres, the Court considered three cases where the claimants were
injured incident to their military service while on active duty, due to the
negligence of other servicemembers.   After reviewing the history and the32
language of the FTCA, the Court found that Congress did not intend to
extend a remedy to claims brought by military members for injuries received
incident to their service.   To read the Act otherwise would create a novel33
32. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950).  The Feres claim was for wrongful death
resulting from a barracks fire caused by a defective heater and an inadequate fire watch.  Id. at
136-37.  The Jefferson claim involved medical negligence related to surgery performed by an
Army surgeon that left a 30-inch-long towel marked “Medical Department U.S. Army” in the
patient.  Id. at 137.  The Griggs claim was a wrongful death suit also based upon medical
negligence.  Id. 
33. Id. at 140-42.  First, the FTCA only provided that the United States shall be liable “to
the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances.”  Id. at 141.  The Court noted
the paucity of guiding material available to aid the Court’s task, but expressed comfort in
knowing that Congress could easily correct any misinterpretations the Court might make.  Id.
at 138.  The Court then held that since no private person can raise an army and no state has
consented to suit by members of its militia, there can be no parallel liability on the United States
for incident to service injuries.  Id. at 141-42.  Second, the distinctively federal character of the
relationship between the government and its Armed Forces members must be governed by
federal law.  The Court indicated that it would not make sense to have a servicemember’s right
to recovery for incident to service injuries depend upon the geographical place of his service,
over which he had no choice.  Id. at 143.  Third, the FTCA was intended to extend a remedy to
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2007
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cause of action and expose the Government to “unprecedented liabilities”
beyond the purpose of the Act.   The Court did not directly reference34
military discipline as a rationale justifying the defense, although separation
of powers concerns and the unique federal interest in the relationship
between soldiers and the government were alluded to, albeit rather
obscurely.   Feres’ progeny, however, drew a much more direct connection35
between the Feres doctrine and the concerns of military discipline and
deference to the political branches of government in military matters.
In United States v. Brown,  decided four years later, the Court considered36
the Feres doctrine in the context of a civilian plaintiff and a military
defendant.  Brown brought suit for negligent treatment he received in a
Veterans’ Administration hospital six years after receiving an honorable
discharge due to knee injuries sustained on active duty.   The Court held37
that Brown’s claim was not barred by the Feres doctrine because his
damages resulted from negligence occurring after his discharge while he
enjoyed civilian status.   Brown’s civilian status at the time of the alleged38
injury was critical because it minimized his claim’s implications for military
discipline.  The Court explained as follows: 
The peculiar and special relationship of the soldier to his
superiors, the effects of the maintenance of such suits on
discipline, and the extreme results that might obtain if suits under
the Tort Claims Act were allowed for negligent orders given or
negligent acts committed in the course of military duty, led the
Court to read that Act as excluding claims of that character.39
those who were denied compensation under sovereign immunity.  Servicemembers, however,
were already permitted generous compensation under the Veterans’ Benefits Act and other
service benefits systems.  Congress, the Court concluded, would not have provided an FTCA
remedy in addition to the existing comprehensive benefits without including some sort of
adjustment provision to prevent a double recovery.  Id. at 144. 
34. Id. at 142. 
35. Id. at 143-44 (“To whatever extent state law may apply to govern the relations between
soldiers or others in the armed forces and persons outside them or nonfederal governmental
agencies, the scope, nature, legal incidents and consequences of the relation between persons
in service and the Government are fundamentally derived from federal sources and governed
by federal authority.” (quoting United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 305-06
(1947))). 
36. 348 U.S. 110 (1954). 
37. Id. at 111-12.  Brown was discharged in 1944 and the knee operations were performed
by the Veterans Administration in 1950 and 1951.  Id. at 110.
38. Id. at 112.  Brown alleged that during the 1951 surgery he received permanent nerve
damage to his leg as a result of the negligent use of a defective tourniquet.  Id. 
39. Id.  While the Court cited Feres, 340 U.S. at 141-43, as support for this rationale, it
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol60/iss4/1
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Where the injured plaintiff is a civilian, however, claims of negligence
against military personnel do not directly impact military discipline because
the civilian plaintiff is not subject to military discipline.   In subsequent40
cases, the Court fully embraced this shift in focus from fiscal concerns to
separation of powers and military discipline considerations, describing the
other factors as “no longer controlling.”  41
The focus on military discipline in the Feres doctrine was further refined
in United States v. Johnson,  decided just one year before Boyle, in which the42
Court applied the Feres doctrine to a case involving a Coast Guard helicopter
pilot killed as a result of the alleged negligence of a Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) civilian employee.   In this context—military plaintiff43
versus civilian government employee—the Court was required for the first
time to determine whether the military status of the tortfeasor was critical to
the application of the Feres doctrine.  44
The Court held that Feres precluded FTCA suits against the government
by servicemembers for injuries arising out of incident to service activity,
regardless of the military or civilian status of the government tortfeasor.  45
The Court recognized that civilian employees of the government, such as
FAA employees, have established working relationships with the military
and often “play an integral role in military activities.”   Although Johnson’s46
suit did not directly allege negligence on the part of the military, such a suit
would nevertheless implicate military judgments and interfere with military
discipline.  As the Court explained:  
[M]ilitary discipline involves not only obedience to orders, but
more generally duty and loyalty to one’s service and to one’s
would require a perceptive and creative reading of Feres to reach that conclusion; subsequent
cases applying Feres acknowledge that Brown was the first time the Court clearly articulated
this rationale.  See Stencel Aero Eng’g Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666, 671-72 (1977)
(applying Feres rationale to bar a cross-claim against the United States seeking indemnity for
claim by pilot injured by alleged malfunction of ejection system on fighter aircraft). 
40. Brown, 348 U.S. at 112. 
41. United States v. Shearer, 473 U.S. 52, 58 n.4 (1985).  In Shearer, the Court barred an
FTCA suit seeking compensation for an Army private kidnapped and murdered by another Army
private due to alleged negligent supervision by the Army.  Id. at 54.  The Court stated that Feres
was best explained by the concerns, articulated in Brown, for the effects such suits might have
on military discipline generally.  Id. at 57.  The other factors were described as “no longer
controlling.”  Id. at 58 n.4. 
42. 481 U.S. 681 (1987). 
43. Id. at 690-91. 
44. Id. at 686. 
45. Id. at 692. 
46. Id. at 691 n.11. 
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country.  Suits brought by service members against the
Government for service-related injuries could undermine the
commitment essential to effective service and thus have the
potential to disrupt military discipline in the broadest sense of the
word.47
Focusing on the military status of the plaintiff, the Court emphasized that the
military is in every respect a “specialized society.”   Permitting claims48
brought by servicemembers for incident to service injuries would involve the
judiciary in sensitive military matters constitutionally allocated to the
political branches of government.   These concerns, more than any other49
rationale, require the military status of the plaintiff, not the tortfeasor, to be
paramount to the Feres doctrine. 
In a vigorous dissent to the Johnson decision, Justice Scalia attacked the
Feres doctrine generally and its application to suits by military members
against civilian government employees in particular.   Foremost in Justice50
Scalia’s criticism was his conclusion that Feres was at odds with the
congressional intent expressed in the FTCA exception disallowing “[a]ny
claim arising out of the combatant activities of the military or naval forces,
or the Coast Guard, during time of war.”   This exception clearly indicated51
to Justice Scalia that Congress specifically considered the special
requirements of the military and crafted an exception much more limited
than the incident to service exception adopted by the Court in Feres.  52
Justice Scalia’s dissent then systematically and compellingly attacked the
original rationales supporting Feres, before acknowledging that “the later-
conceived-of ‘military discipline’ rationale [serves] as the ‘best’
explanation” for Feres.   While Justice Scalia conceded the “possibility that53
47. Id. at 691. 
48. Id. 
49. Id. at 690-91 (citing Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 507 (1986); Parker v. Levy,
417 U.S. 733, 743 (1974)). 
50. Id. at 692-702 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  Justice Scalia’s dissent was joined by Justices
Brennan, Marshall and Stevens. 
51. Id. at 693 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2680(j) (1982)) (emphasis omitted) (alteration in
original).  In response to Justice Scalia’s dissent, the Court noted that in the forty years since
the Feres decision, Congress had taken no action to alter “any misinterpretation” of its intent,
despite the Court’s invitations to do so if it erred in Feres.  Id. at 688 n.9 (majority opinion). 
52. Id. at 693 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
53. Id. at 698-99 (citing United States v. Shearer, 473 U.S. 52, 57 (1985); Chappell v.
Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 299 (1983); United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150, 162 (1963)); see also
Green & Matasar, supra note 28, at 710-11 (speculating that the Court’s rejection of Feres as
the foundation for the government contractor defense lies in Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion
in Johnson). 
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some suits brought by servicemen will adversely affect military discipline,”
the effect was not so substantial as to justify interpreting the FTCA in a way
he believed was clearly contrary to Congress’s intent.  54
Justice Scalia’s dissent is not an attack on the perceived importance of
military discipline or on the Court’s reluctance to interfere with the political
branch’s military decisions.  Instead, it is an attack on what Justice Scalia
saw as judicial second-guessing of Congress’s intent in drafting the FTCA, 
disregarding the plain language of the statute itself.   This disdain for a55
perceived judicial trespass on congressional intent is never raised in Boyle. 
It may, however, offer a better explanation for the Court’s rejection of Feres
as the basis of the government contractor defense than the Court’s opinion
in Boyle.56
B. The McKay Test Adopts the Feres Rationales to Bar Claims by
Servicemembers Against Government Contractors
At the same time the Feres rationales were developing for claims brought
directly against the government, the courts were also applying the rationales
of Feres to bar claims brought by servicemembers against government
contractors for design defects.  Because the Supreme Court narrowed the
Feres doctrine’s rationales primarily to military discipline, the lower courts
focused on military discipline in government contractor cases.  
In McKay v. Rockwell International Corp.,  the Ninth Circuit considered57
consolidated maritime actions concerning two Navy pilots killed in
unrelated crashes of RA-5C aircraft off the coast of Florida.   Both pilots58
were forced to eject when their aircraft caught fire during training
missions.   Autopsies revealed that the pilots’ deaths were probably caused59
by injuries sustained as a result of the ejections.   Rockwell manufactured60
54. Johnson, 481 U.S. at 699 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
55. Id.
56. Green & Matasar, supra note 28, at 710-11 (noting that the best explanation for the
Boyle Court’s rejection of Feres can be found in Justice Scalia’s dissent in Johnson); David E.
Seidelson, From Feres v. United States to Boyle v. United Technologies Corp.: An Examination
of Supreme Court Jurisprudence and a Couple of Suggestions, 32 DUQ. L. REV. 219, 261
(1994) (noting a cynic might conclude the Court rejected Feres as the foundation for the
government contractor defense for reasons articulated in Scalia’s dissent in Johnson, rather than
reasons stated in the Boyle opinion). 
57. 704 F.2d 444 (9th Cir. 1983). 
58. Id. at 446-47.  Jurisdiction of the court was alleged under both general maritime law and
the Death on the High Seas Act.  Id. at 447 & n.1 (citing 46 U.S.C. §§ 761-767 (1982)). 
59. Id. at 446. 
60. Id.
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both the aircraft and the ejection system, and the district court held
Rockwell strictly liable for design defects in the ejection system.   61
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed the judgment for the plaintiffs,
finding that the government contractor defense precluded recovery by
servicemembers from suppliers of military equipment for design defects
approved by the government.   The court held that the rationales for the62
defense paralleled those supporting the Feres doctrine.   The court63
emphasized that resolving defective design claims regarding military
equipment for which the government approved the design would necessarily
force the judiciary to second-guess military decisions.   The exigencies of64
national defense compel the United States to push technological limits and
to incur risks that would be unacceptable in ordinary consumer goods.  65
Trials to resolve such claims would require military members to testify about
their actions and the decisions of their superior officers, raising concerns
about the negative effect this might have on military discipline.   In66
addition, the defense protects the government from the liability costs arising
from injuries to military personnel sustained within the scope of their
service.   Allowing servicemembers’ suits against a government contractor67
would subvert this protection, because the liability costs would be passed on
to the government “through cost overrun provisions in equipment contracts,
through reflecting the price of liability insurance in the contracts, or through
higher prices in later equipment sales.”  68
To effectuate a defense addressing these concerns, the McKay court
adopted the following test for the government contractor defense: 
[A] supplier of military equipment is not subject to . . . liability
for a design defect where: (1) the United States is immune from
61. Specifically, the district court applied the version of strict products liability found in
the Restatement (Second) of Torts, section 402A.  McKay, 704 F.2d at 447 (citing Pan-Alaska
Fisheries, Inc. v. Marine Constr. & Design Co., 565 F.2d 1129 (9th Cir. 1978) (applying
Restatement (Second) of Torts, section 402A to admiralty)). 
62. McKay, 704 F.2d at 447. 
63. Id. at 449. 
64. Id.
65. Id. at 449-50.  The court also noted that the government contractor may not be free to
adopt designs that would satisfy products liability law intended to govern ordinary commercial
goods.  Id.  Imposing liability exclusively on the contractor under such circumstances would
unfairly allocate full responsibility on the contractor for acts partially or wholly attributable to
the government.  Id. at 450 (citing In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 506 F. Supp. 762,
794 (E.D.N.Y. 1980)). 
66. Id. at 449. 
67. Id. at 449 n.7.
68. Id. at 449.  
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liability under Feres and Stencel, (2) the supplier proves that the
United States established, or approved, reasonably precise
specifications for the allegedly defective military equipment, (3)
the equipment conformed to those specifications, and (4) the
supplier warned the United States about . . . dangers involved in
the use of the equipment that were known to the supplier but not
to the United States.69
This test allows the contractor to exercise initiative and discretion in the
formulation of the product design, without liability, as long as the
government is involved in the process and approves the final design.  70
While this test works within the facts of a case involving a design defect
claim, the court never considered whether the same rationale justified the
application of the defense to other products liability claims.  71
The McKay test was adopted by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in
Tozer v. LTV Corp.,  in which the widow of a Navy pilot brought claims72
under the Death on the High Seas Act and general maritime law.   She73
raised strict liability and negligent design claims regarding a maintenance
access panel known as a “Buick Hood,” which was alleged to have caused
the crash of a Navy RF-8G reconnaissance aircraft when it came off during
flight.   At the Navy’s request, the defendant had modified the access panel74
to allow rapid, easy access, employing quick-fastening “camlocks” which
could be released by the turn of a screwdriver.   Tozer contended that the75
design failed because the defendant did not use redundant camlocks to
prevent the panel from opening during flight should a single camlock fail
due to foreseeable wear, vibration, or corrosion.   The trial court instructed76
the jury that the government contractor defense precluded recovery on the
basis of strict liability but that the defense did not apply to the negligent
design claim.  The jury returned a verdict for Tozer and the defendant
appealed.77
69. Id. at 451.  The McKay court apparently intended to limit the application of the defense
to equipment with a unique military function, but did not define that term other than to note that
the line separating “military equipment” from ordinary consumer goods used by the military
would be drawn somewhere between a can of beans and the reconnaissance aircraft at issue in
that case.  Id.  
70. Id. at 450-51. 
71. See infra Part III.C (discussing incongruity of McKay test and rationale for the defense). 
72. 792 F.2d 403 (4th Cir. 1986). 
73. Id. at 404.
74. Id. 
75. Id. 
76. Id. at 404-05. 
77. Id. at 405. 
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On appeal, the Fourth Circuit reversed the verdict and remanded the case
for entry of judgment in favor of the defendants on the basis that the
government contractor defense precluded recovery on both the negligent
design and strict liability claims.   In adopting the government contractor78
defense, the Tozer court focused almost entirely on the constitutional
allocation of military matters to the political branches of government and on
military discipline concerns.   The court noted that the close working79
relationship between the military and its defense contractors makes it almost
impossible to contend that a contractor defectively designed a piece of
military equipment without actively criticizing a military decision.  80
Litigation would require that servicemembers question military decisions in
civilian courts, even where the suit is brought only against the defense
contractor.   Appropriate civilian scrutiny over the safety and necessity of81
weapon systems is exerted through executive and legislative oversight, not
through lawsuits by servicemembers seeking monetary damages.   The82
Tozer court then adopted the test for the government contractor defense
applied by McKay, without any critical analysis as to whether the test was
properly tailored to fit the federal interest justifying the defense.83
The history of the Feres doctrine demonstrates that it was not clearly
explained or justified at its inception, but subsequent cases refined the
analysis and clarified its underlying concerns as military discipline and
separation of powers.  The doctrine was then applied to servicemember suits
against government contractors in design defect cases.  Some thirty-eight
years after Feres, the Boyle Court embarked on an entirely new direction for
the government contractor defense.
III. Boyle v. United Technologies Corp.: A New Rationale for the
Government Contractor Defense
78. Id. at 409.  Although the cause of action in Tozer arose under federal law, general
maritime law, and the Death on the High Seas Act, the court noted that the federal defense
would apply equally to state law claims under diversity jurisdiction because of the paramount
federal interests at issue.  Id. at 409 n.3.  
79. Id. at 405-06.  In the absence of the defense, the judiciary would be invited to “second-
guess” purely military decisions regarding the design of, in this instance, a sophisticated
reconnaissance aircraft. 
80. Id. at 406. 
81. Id. 
82. Id. at 406-07.
83. Id. at 408; see also infra Part III.C (discussing incongruity of McKay test and rationale
for the defense). 
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A. Shifting from Military Deference to Fiscal Concerns and Government
Discretion
In Boyle v. United Technologies Corp.,  a United States Marine Corps84
helicopter co-pilot was killed during a training exercise when his CH-53D
helicopter crashed off the coast of Virginia Beach, Virginia.   Boyle’s father85
brought suit against the Sikorsky Division of United Technologies, the
builder of the helicopter under a contract with the United States.   He86
alleged that Sikorsky had defectively repaired a servo in the flight control
system causing the crash.  He further alleged that Boyle survived the impact
but drowned as a result of a defectively designed co-pilot’s emergency
escape system.   Specifically, he alleged that Boyle was unable to open the87
co-pilot’s emergency escape hatch because the escape hatch handle was
obstructed by other equipment and because water pressure held the hatch
closed, since the hatch was designed to open out rather than in.  88
The Fourth Circuit reversed a jury verdict in Boyle’s favor, holding that
Boyle had failed to prove that repair work performed by Sikorsky caused the
crash and that the defective design claims were precluded by the “military
contractor defense”  that the Fourth Circuit first recognized the same day89
in Tozer v. LTV Corp.   The court did not expand upon its analysis in Tozer90
but simply applied the government contractor defense to the facts in Boyle.  91
Because the evidence established that the Navy and Sikorsky had worked
together in the design of the helicopter and that the Navy reviewed and
approved a detailed mock-up of the cockpit and escape hatch,  the Fourth92
Circuit had little difficulty applying the McKay test and finding that the
government contractor defense precluded Boyle’s claims against Sikorsky
for both negligence and breach of warranty.   93
Upon Boyle’s appeal, the Supreme Court approved the creation of a
federal common law government contractor defense in a five-to-four
84. 487 U.S. 500 (1988). 
85. Id. at 502. 
86. Id.
87. Id. at 503. 
88. Id.
89. Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 792 F.2d 413, 414 (4th Cir. 1986), vacated, 487 U.S. 500
(1988).  Boyle alleged both negligence and breach of warranty in the design of the escape hatch. 
Virginia products liability law has never recognized a strict liability cause of action in products
liability, but Virginia’s breach of warranty cause of action is closely related to the strict liability
claim recognized in the Restatement (Second) of Torts, section 402A.  Lust v. Clark Equip. Co.,
792 F.2d 436, 439 (4th Cir. 1986).
90. Boyle, 792 F.2d at 414 (citing Tozer v. LTV Corp., 792 F.2d 403 (4th Cir. 1986)). 
91. Id. at 415. 
92. Id.
93. Id. at 415-16. 
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decision, but rejected Feres as the basis for the defense.   Writing for the94
five-member majority, Justice Scalia acknowledged that federal common
law may preempt state law in areas involving “uniquely federal interests”
subject exclusively to federal control by the Constitution and laws of the
United States.   Nevertheless, the Court opted not to focus on the95
controlling federal interests in the Feres doctrine: the separation of powers
in military affairs and military discipline.  Rather, the Court found that the
imposition of liability on a government contractor for the approved design
of military equipment borders upon two areas that the Court had previously
found to involve “uniquely federal interests” sufficient to justify the
exclusive application of federal common law.  First, federal common law
exclusively governs the rights and obligations of the United States under its
contracts.   Second, the civil liability of federal officials for actions taken96
in the course of their duties has long been held to warrant the displacement
of state law.   While acknowledging that Boyle’s tort claim did not directly97
involve contractual rights and obligations of the United States or the
immunity of federal officials, the Court regarded the claim as arising from
performance of the defendant’s procurement contract with the government
and as challenging a design approved by federal officials.  98
While the identification of these uniquely federal interests was a
necessary condition for the displacement of state law, the Court held that the
government contractor defense should apply only where a “significant
conflict” exists between the federal interests and the operation of state law.  99
The Court then sought a limiting principle that would identify when a
94. Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 510  (1988).
95. Id. at 504 (citing Tex. Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 640 (1981);
United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 726-29 (1979); Banco Nacional de Cuba
v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 426-27 (1964); Howard v. Lyons, 360 U.S. 593, 597 (1959);
Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 366-67 (1943); D’Oench, Duhme & Co.
v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447, 457-58 (1942)).
96. Id. (citing United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580, 592-94 (1973);
Priebe & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 332 U.S. 407, 411 (1947); Nat’l Metro. Bank v. United
States, 323 U.S. 454, 456 (1945); Clearfield Trust, 318 U.S. at 366-67). 
97. Id. at 505 (citing Westfall v. Erwin, 484 U.S. 292, 295 (1988); Howard, 360 U.S. at
597; Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 569-74 (1959) (plurality opinion); id. at 577 (Black, J.,
concurring)). 
98. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 504.  But see Green & Matasar, supra note 28, at 647-72 (criticizing
the Court’s unnecessary and confusing efforts to shoehorn the defense into government contract
cases and government employee immunity, rather than simply and directly supporting creation
of federal common law defense based on protection of government discretion in procurement). 
99. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 507. 
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significant conflict with the federal interest was sufficiently present,
justifying the imposition of federal common law.  100
The Court first considered the Feres doctrine as the limiting principle to
identify significant conflicts with the federal interest in procurement of
military equipment, as this was the basis relied upon by the appellate court
applying the McKay test.   The Court, however, dismissed the costs101
rationale of Feres as “no longer controlling” and ignored the more
compelling, albeit “later conceived,” rationales of military discipline and the
constitutional allocation of military matters to the political branches.   This102
was particularly surprising because both the respondent’s brief and the
amicus brief of the United States focused upon judicial deference to the
political branches of government in military matters and military
discipline.   Nevertheless, the Court exclusively focused on Feres’s cost-103
controlling concerns.  This focus resulted in the Court’s rejection of Feres
as the source of conflict for the government contractor defense because it
was deemed too broad in some respects and too narrow in others.   104
Feres was considered too narrow because it would bar servicemembers’
suits but not suits by civilians.  The costs of civilian suits would still be
passed through to the government and impermissibly interfere with
government discretion.   At the same time, Feres was considered too broad105
because a Feres-based government contractor defense would prohibit all
service-related products liability claims against the manufacturer, making
the three remaining criteria of the McKay test inexplicable.   For example,106
a Feres-based defense would logically bar service-related suits even where
the injury was caused by a design feature of a helicopter purchased by model
number from stock supplies or by any standard equipment procured by the
government.   The Court reasoned that it would be “impossible to say that107
100. Id. at 509. 
101. Id. at 510-11. 
102. Id. at 510. 
103. Supp. Brief of Respondent on Reargument at 12, Boyle, 487 U.S. 500 (No. 86-492)
(purpose of defense is to assure proper distribution of functions between judicial and political
branches of government); id. at 4 (required inquiry in absence of defense would have negative
effect on military discipline); Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Affirmance
at 18, Boyle, 487 U.S. 500 (No. 86-492) (“The driving forces behind recognition of a military
contractor defense are the effects, both direct and indirect, of litigation in calling into question
military judgments concerning equipment safety and related matters, thus impairing the federal
government’s constitutional authority to defend the country.”).
104. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 510. 
105. Id. at 511-12. 
106. Id. at 510. 
107. See id. at 510-11.
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2007
666 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol.  60:647
the Government has a significant interest in [any] particular feature” of stock
or standard equipment because the government was not involved in the
design of the allegedly defective product feature.   108
After rejecting Feres, the Court held that the discretionary function
exemption to the FTCA  would provide a better basis for identifying109
“significant conflict[s]” between state tort law and the federal interests in
procurement of military equipment.   Under the FTCA, Congress waived110
sovereign immunity for damages claims against the United States for
personal injury or death “caused by the negligence or wrongful act or
omission of any employee of the Government”  acting within the scope of111
employment, to the extent that a private person would be liable under the
law of the place where the conduct occurred.   Nevertheless, Congress112
expressly excluded from this consent to suit any claim “based upon the
exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary
function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the
Government, whether or not the discretion involved be abused.”  113
Commonly known as the “discretionary function exception,” the purpose of
this exception is to prevent tort actions from becoming tools for judicial
second-guessing of legislative and administrative decisions grounded in
social, economic, and political policy.  114
While acknowledging that Boyle’s claim sought to impose liability on a
defense contractor, rather than to impose liability on the United States for
the discretionary action of an employee, the Court nevertheless concluded
that suits like Boyle’s would have the same effect sought to be avoided by
the discretionary function exception.   The Court reasoned that the115
selection of the appropriate design of military equipment involves the
balancing of many social, political and economic concerns, including the
“trade-off between greater safety and greater combat effectiveness.”   In116
particular, without the government contractor defense, discretionary
decisions regarding defense expenditures for the procurement of military
equipment would be impacted.  Judgments against contractors would be
passed through to the United States, as contractors would raise prices to
108. Id. at 509. 
109. Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (2000).
110. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 511-12. 
111. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b). 
112. Id. 
113. Id. § 2680(a); Boyle, 487 U.S. at 511. 
114. United States v. Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. 797, 814 (1984) (discussing legislative history
of discretionary function exception). 
115. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 511. 
116. Id. 
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cover the cost of such judgments or to insure against them.   As the Court117
stated, “It [would] make[] little sense to insulate the Government against
financial liability for the judgment that a particular feature of military
equipment is necessary when the Government produces the equipment itself,
but not when it contracts for the production.”   Although the Court rejected118
the lower court’s reliance on the Feres doctrine in favor of the discretionary
function exception, the Court went on to adopt the remaining three
conditions of the McKay test as defining the appropriate scope of the federal
common law government contractor defense.   119
No doubt the Boyle Court intended its opinion to place the government
contractor defense on a more solid foundation by removing it from the often
criticized and misunderstood Feres doctrine.  The Boyle decision, however,
radically altered the defense and may have produced some unexpected
consequences.  By shifting the focus of the defense from Feres to the
discretionary function exception, the Court removed the defense from its
military foundation, expanded its application to civilian plaintiffs, and
opened the door to the application of the defense to government procurement
beyond the military context.  These expansions have created conflicts in the
courts as to the scope of the defense  and have received substantial120
criticism in scholarly literature.121
B. The Discretionary Function Exception Rationale Is Not Logically
Limited to Military Procurement
The foundational shift away from Feres’s military discipline to the
FTCA’s discretionary function exception created uncertainty as to the scope
of the government contractor defense.  Under the discretionary function
exception, Congress has refused to waive sovereign immunity for decisions
117. Id. at 512. 
118. Id. 
119. Id. 
120. See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text. 
121. See, e.g., Terrie Hanna, Note, The Government Contract Defense and the Impact of
Boyle v. United Technologies Corporation, 70 B.U. L. REV. 691 (1990) (criticizing the Boyle
opinion as loosely worded, urging courts to interpret it narrowly and suggesting legislative
intervention); see also David E. Seidelson, The Government Contractor Defense and the
Negligent Contractor: The Devil Made Me Do It, 7 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 259 (1998) (criticizing
Boyle’s defense as too sweeping in its application and proposing it should not apply where
contractor fails to warn government of dangers of which contractor had constructive
knowledge); Steven Brian Loy, Note, The Government Contractor Defense: Is It a Weapon
Only for the Military?, 83 KY. L.J. 505 (1994-1995) (noting broad scope of discretionary
function exception but urging defense be limited to military contractors where federal
government has a unique interest). 
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made in all branches of the federal government that are grounded in social,
economic, or political policy.   The exception prevents “unwarranted and122
potentially disruptive”  judicial “second-guessing” of legislative and123
executive decisions founded upon the balancing of competing policy
considerations.   Given the broad purpose of the discretionary function124
exception, however, it would not logically be limited to military
procurement but would apply to all government procurement where the
government exercised discretion.125
The Court’s focus on the discretionary function exception clearly
recognized the separation of powers concerns implicated in Boyle.  126
Nevertheless, while the discretionary function exception protects the
political branches of government from judicial second-guessing of
discretionary policy decisions, it is not limited to the specific separation of
powers concerns related to military matters.   Instead, the discretionary127
function exception has been applied to bar claims involving the regulation
of fungicide labeling,  the inspection of sewer systems,  the prohibition128 129
of the use of a flame-retardant compound on children’s sleepwear,  the130
safety and staffing of national forests,  the denial of patent applications,131 132
the failure to prevent the importation of defective gas cylinders,  and the133
release of dam waters.134
The language of the Boyle Court’s opinion added to the confusion
regarding the scope of the defense.  At several places in the opinion, the
122. United States v. Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. 797, 814 (1984) (discussing legislative history
of discretionary function exception). 
123. Avery v. United States, 434 F. Supp. 937, 943 n.7 (D. Conn. 1977) (discussing the
discretionary function exception).
124. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 511.
125. See, e.g., Green & Matasar, supra note 28, at 688-97. 
126. See Boyle, 487 U.S. at 511-12. 
127. See, e.g., Green & Matasar, supra note 28, at 688-97. 
128. First Nat’l Bank in Albuquerque v. United States, 552 F.2d 370 (10th Cir. 1977)
(involving negligent labeling claim against Department of Agriculture regarding fungicide that
contained mercury). 
129. Pennbank v. United States, 779 F.2d 175 (3d Cir. 1985). 
130. Jayvee Brand, Inc. v. United States, 721 F.2d 385 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (involving
Consumer Product Safety Commission ban on use of flame-retardant compounds by
manufacturer of children’s sleepwear). 
131. Sharp ex rel. Estate of Sharp v. United States, 401 F.3d 440 (6th Cir. 2005). 
132. Lindsey v. United States, 778 F.2d 1143 (5th Cir. 1985). 
133. Carib Gas Corp. v. Del. Valley Indus. Gases, Inc., 660 F. Supp. 419 (D.V.I. 1987), aff’d
without opinion, 838 F.2d 459 (3d Cir. 1987). 
134. Olson v. United States, 93 F. Supp. 150 (D.N.D. 1950). 
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Court refers to the defense as the “military contractor defense”  or135
discusses it in terms that imply its application is limited to suppliers of
military equipment.   At other points in the opinion, however, the Court136
uses the more general “government contractor defense” phrasing  and137
discusses the defense with language and examples that imply a general
application to all government product procurement.   The Boyle dissent138
recognized the broad logical application of the defense based upon the
discretionary function exception crafted by the Court and predicted that its
application would not be limited to military equipment, but would be applied
to any equipment purchased by the government where the government
approves reasonably precise specifications.   The Boyle majority did not139
challenge this interpretation.140
Immediately after the Court’s decision in Boyle, commentators predicted
that the discretionary function exception foundation would lead to the
application of the defense to cases outside of the military equipment
context.   In the nineteen years since Boyle, various courts have struggled141
135. Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 503, 514 (1988); id. at 526 n.4 (Brennan,
J., dissenting).
136. Id. at 511 (majority opinion) (“[T]he selection of the appropriate design for military
equipment to be used by our Armed Forces is assuredly a discretionary function . . . .”).  The
Court then describes the three McKay conditions for the defense as precluding liability for
“design defects in military [cases].”  Id. at 512. 
137. Id. at 510, 513-14; id. at 516 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
138. At some points, the Court speaks in general terms about the uniquely federal interest
in the government “procurement of equipment.”  Id. at 507 (majority opinion).  At other points,
the Court speaks specifically about the procurement of “military equipment.”  Id. at 512. 
139. Id. at 516 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“[The defense] applies not only to military
equipment like the CH-53D helicopter, but (so far as I can tell) to any made-to-order gadget that
the Federal Government might purchase after previewing plans—from NASA’s Challenger
space shuttle to the Postal Service’s old mail cars.”). 
140. See Yeroshefsky v. Unisys Corp., 962 F. Supp. 710, 716 (D. Md. 1997).  In holding that
the government contractor defense applies to non-military procurement, the court in Yeroshefsky
found it significant that the dissent’s broad interpretation of the defense was not contested by
the majority.  Id. at 716.
141. Green & Matasar, supra note 28, at 648-89 (arguing that defense based upon
discretionary function exception cannot logically be constrained to military design defect cases);
JoAnne Marie Lyons, Note, Boyle v. United Technologies Corp.: New Ground for the
Government Contractor Defense, 67 N.C. L. REV. 1172, 1189 (1989).  Lyons notes that the
discretionary function premise of the defense provides potential for application outside the field
of military contracts, but argues for non-military application limited to instances where
contractor liability would greatly inhibit the government’s ability to accomplish specific goals. 
Without explaining what specific goals might make application appropriate outside of the
military procurement arena, Lyons suggests that the defense may have application to contracts
for the operation of nuclear power plants, the disposal of toxic waste, or the construction of
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with the ambiguous scope of the defense and have reached divergent
conclusions.   As expected, the majority of courts addressing the issue have142
applied the government contractor defense to non-military contracts.  143
These courts have focused upon the broad application of the discretionary
function exception supporting Boyle and the undesirability of judicial
second-guessing of federal policy decisions that necessarily occurs in the
absence of the defense.  These courts have also emphasized the concern that
the contractors’ liability costs would be passed through to the government
in the form of higher prices.144
Despite the seemingly broad applicability the discretionary function
exception offers the government contractor defense, a minority of courts
have limited the defense to claims arising from allegations of defectively
designed military equipment.   The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has145
highways.  Id. at 1190.  
142. See generally Watts, supra note 27 (discussing circuit split regarding whether Boyle
defense applies to non-military procurement). 
143. Carley v. Wheeled Coach, 991 F.2d 1117, 1121-22 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding defense
available to nonmilitary contractor for alleged design defect in ambulance); Yeroshefsky, 962
F. Supp. at 717 (determining defense barred postal service employee’s claim against
manufacturer of letter sorting machine); Fagans v. Unisys Corp., 945 F. Supp. 3, 6 n.3 (D.D.C.
1996) (finding defense supports summary judgment for letter sorting machine manufacturer);
Wisner v. Unisys Corp., 917 F. Supp. 1501, 1509-10 (D. Kan. 1996) (granting summary
judgment for manufacturer of letter sorting machine based on defense); Richland-Lexington
Airport Dist. v. Atlas Props., Inc., 854 F. Supp. 400, 422 (D.S.C. 1994) (applying defense to
preclude claim for negligent performance of contract with EPA to excavate, remove, and
stockpile contaminated soil); Lamb v. Martin Marietta Energy Sys., Inc., 835 F. Supp. 959, 966
(W.D. Ky. 1993) (granting summary judgment to privately run nuclear production facility based
on defense); Johnson v. Grumman Corp., 806 F. Supp. 212, 217-18 (W.D. Wis. 1992) (denying
summary judgment for defendant postal truck manufacturer due to disputed issues on elements
of defense); Silverstein v. Northrop Grumman Corp., 842 A.2d 881, 889 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 2004) (holding that Boyle’s government contractor defense applied to postal delivery
vehicle manufactured to United States Postal Service specifications); see also Boruski v. United
States, 803 F.2d 1421, 1430 (7th Cir. 1986) (affirming summary judgment based on government
contractor defense in civilian context, pre-Boyle); Burgess v. Colo. Serum Co., 772 F.2d 844,
846 (11th Cir. 1985) (applying government contractor defense to non-military products, pre-
Boyle); Kelly A. Moore, Recent Development, The Third Circuit Expands the Government
Contractor Defense to Include Nonmilitary Contractors, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1435 (1994)
(discussing and criticizing non-military application of defense in Carley v. Wheeled Coach). 
144. Carley, 991 F.2d at 1121-22; Yeroshefsky, 962 F. Supp. at 715-17; Fagans, 945 F.
Supp. at 6 n.3; Wisner, 917 F. Supp. at 1509-10; Richland-Lexington Airport Dist., 854 F.
Supp. at 422; Lamb, 835 F. Supp. at 966; Johnson, 806 F. Supp. at 217-18; see also Boruski,
803 F.2d at 1430; Burgess, 772 F.2d at 846.
145. In re Haw. Fed. Asbestos Cases, 960 F.2d 806, 812 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding asbestos
insulation not military equipment entitled to protection of government contractor defense);
Nielson v. George Diamond Vogel Paint Co., 892 F.2d 1450, 1453-55 (9th Cir. 1990) (refusing
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twice expressly limited the application of the government contractor defense
to the procurement of military equipment.   In those decisions, the court146
focused on the highly complex and sensitive decisions the military makes in
developing new equipment.   The court noted that these concerns are not147
present with other government procurement of products readily available on
the commercial market and designed with consideration of the broader needs
of end-users in the private sector.   In such cases, the court reasoned that148
the manufacturer will have already factored the cost of liability for ordinary
torts into the product price.149
While the rationale of the Ninth Circuit is not unreasonable, the limitation
is logical only if the defense seeks narrowly to protect the particularly acute
separation of powers concerns related to military matters and not
government discretion generally.  Indeed, separation of powers in military
matters is the particular federal interest that is the focus of Feres,  not the150
discretionary function exception.
C. The Discretionary Function Exception Rationale Is Not Logically
Limited to Design Defects Resulting from Reasonably Precise
Government Specifications
The Boyle Court recognized that the selection of military equipment
involves the balancing of many technical, military, and even social
considerations, including specifically the trade-off between greater safety and
greater combat effectiveness.   The Court believed these considerations were151
sufficiently protected by the discretionary function exception and the three-
part test adopted from McKay.  Under this test, Boyle only applies when
to bar, on basis of federal government contractor defense, civilian plaintiff’s claim against paint
manufacturer for injuries suffered from exposure to paint used to paint a civilian dam, but
holding that under Idaho law paint contractor shared government’s immunity for paint
manufactured to government specifications); see also In re Chateaugay Corp., 146 B.R. 339,
351 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992) (stating government contractor defense does not apply to postal
delivery vehicles manufactured for U.S. Postal Service because they are not military equipment). 
But see Silverstein, 842 A.2d at 889 (holding that Boyle’s government contractor defense
applies to postal delivery vehicle manufactured to U.S. Postal Service specifications). 
146. In re Haw. Fed. Asbestos Cases, 960 F.2d at 812; Nielson, 892 F.2d at 1453. 
147. In re Haw. Fed. Asbestos Cases, 960 F.2d at 811; Nielson, 892 F.2d at 1455. 
148. In re Haw. Fed. Asbestos Cases, 960 F.2d at 812. 
149. Id. at 811; see also Hazel Glenn Beh, The Government Contractor Defense: When Do
Governmental Interests Justify Excusing a Manufacturer’s Liability for Defective Products?,
28 SETON HALL L. REV. 430 (1997) (asserting Ninth Circuit’s limitation of defense to military
procurement should be followed by other circuits because only in this area is usurping state law
justifiable).
150. See United States v. Johnson, 481 U.S. 681, 688-89 (1987).
151. Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 511 (1988). 
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design defects were specified or approved by the government and the
manufacturer warned of dangers known to the contractor but not to the
government.  The Court stated that these requirements ensure that the
government contractor defense would only apply where the suit would
frustrate the policy of the discretionary function.152
The discretionary function exception, however, is not logically limited to
design defect cases.   Under most states’ strict liability law, a plaintiff is153
not required to prove that the manufacturer was negligent in the selection of
the design.   Strict liability focuses on the objective state of the product,154
not the conduct of the manufacturer.   The manufacturer is strictly liable155
for injuries caused by defective products.   Products are defective if they156
152. Id. at 512. 
153. See Green & Matasar, supra note 28, at 702-05 (explaining, with examples, how
government discretionary considerations could result in manufacturing defects that should
logically be protected by discretionary function exception-based defense). 
154. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965); DAVID G. OWEN, PRODUCTS
LIABILITY LAW § 5.3 (2005) (noting forty-five states, District of Columbia and Virgin Islands
have adopted strict liability in tort). 
155. OWEN, supra note 154 (stating seller is liable for product defect even though he has
exercised all possible care).
156. Id. (indicating manufacturer, distributor, retailer and all in chain of distribution are
strictly liable for product defects).
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are “unreasonably dangerous.”   Generally, a product may be unreasonably157
dangerous because of manufacturing defects, design defects, or warning
defects.   Under the Boyle Court’s decision, however, contractors sued for158
manufacturing defects and warning defects under these principles would not
have the benefit of the government contractor defense.
Manufacturing defect claims clearly have the potential to interfere with
the exercise of government discretion.   For example, in order to keep159
down prices and increase the rate of production, the government may
approve inspections of a random sampling of products as they roll off the
assembly line rather than requiring that each product be individually
inspected.  If a defectively manufactured product reaches the troops and
causes injury, the manufacturing defect claim is not precluded by the
defense, despite the fact that the claim will result in second-guessing of this
discretionary decision by the government.   Similarly, the government may160
choose to purchase ammunition from one manufacturer, rather than another,
merely because of a higher rate of production.  If the chosen manufacturer
produces more ammunition with manufacturing defects, the government
might be willing to accept this increase in defects in order to increase the
availability of desperately needed ammunition.  Although the government
might not approve of, or even be aware of, the different manufacturing
methods used by the two ammunition producers, the government still made
a discretionary decision balancing quality against quantity.  Again, although
the goal of Boyle’s government contractor defense is to protect
governmental discretion in procurement, the defense does not apply in these
manufacturing defect situations. 
Similarly, even if military equipment is designed as safely as possible and
to government specifications, it is defective under most state products
157. Under the Restatement (Second) of Torts, section 402A, comment i, a product is
defective and unreasonably dangerous when it is “dangerous to an extent beyond that which
would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer.”  This formulation is still espoused by some
courts, but many others have adopted some form of cost-benefit, risk-utility analysis.  OWEN,
supra note 154, § 5.7; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 (1998)
(applying true strict liability only to manufacturing defects). 
158. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 (1998). 
159. See Green & Matasar, supra note 28, at 701-03 (discussing underinclusive nature of
Boyle test given the goal of protecting government discretion, and providing examples of
manufacturing defects implicating exercise of governmental discretion). 
160. See Bailey v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 989 F.2d 794, 801 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding
that government contractor defense only applies to manufacturing defect cases if the government
approved or specified the process); Bentzlin v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 833 F. Supp. 1486, 1491
n.8 (C.D. Cal. 1993) (holding that manufacturing defect claims are barred where government
asserts that suit undermines federal interest in procuring military equipment). 
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liability laws if it fails to warn users of hidden dangers.   Although Boyle161
did not specifically address warning defect claims, many courts have, to
varying degrees, applied the defense to these claims.  Some courts have
precluded claims where the government approved the inadequate
warnings.   Other courts have held that such claims are barred only where162
the government expressly dictated the content of the warnings  or have163
simply held that the defense does not apply to warnings claims.   In the164
context of military equipment, however, the government might very well
choose not to warn servicemembers of all the dangers associated with the
use of their equipment.165
Even if the Boyle Court believed that only certain forms of governmental
discretion deserve protection, the precise parameters of the three-part
McKay test are difficult to apply.   The dissent in Boyle foresaw difficulty166
with the reasonably precise specifications requirement, fearing that such
approval might consist of “perhaps no more than a rubber stamp from a
federal procurement officer who might or might not have noticed or cared
about the defects, or even had the expertise to discover them.”   Some167
courts have expressly rejected the application of the government contractor
defense where government approval has amounted to a mere “rubber
stamp.”   These courts have reasoned that if the foundation of the defense168
is the discretionary function exception, discretion must be exercised by the 
161. OWEN, supra note 154, § 9.1; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2(c)
(1998). 
162. See, e.g., Kerstetter v. Pac. Scientific Co., 210 F.3d 431, 438-39 (5th Cir. 2000)
(explaining the dangers of uncommanded release of pilot restraint system). 
163. See, e.g., In re Joint E. & S. Dist. N.Y. Asbestos Litig., 897 F.2d 626, 630 (2d Cir.
1990) (explaining the dangers of asbestos). 
164. Glassco v. Miller Equip. Co., 966 F.2d 641, 644 (11th Cir. 1992) (noting the hazards
associated with use of leather linemen belt); McCormick v. C.E. Thurston & Sons, Inc., 977 F.
Supp. 400, 403 (E.D. Va. 1997) (noting the hazards of asbestos exposure).
165. Green & Matasar, supra note 28, at 703-05. 
166. See Colin P. Cahoon, Boyle Under Siege, 59 J. AIR L. & COM. 815 (1994) (discussing
broad application of defense and “litigation war” over meaning and application of Boyle’s three-
part test). 
167. Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 515 (1988) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
168. Trevino v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 865 F.2d 1474, 1480 (5th Cir. 1989) (discussing the
design of Navy diving chamber). 
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government and not by the contractor for the defense to apply.   Only169
detailed quantitative specifications—not vague qualitative specifications
such as “fail-safe,” “simple,” or “inexpensive”—satisfy the test.   At the170
most extreme, some courts have required that the government actually
choose the particular design feature alleged to have caused the injury.   If171
the government delegates the design of the disputed feature to the contractor,
requiring only that the design satisfy some minimal or general government
standards, ultimate government approval of the design without substantive
review or evaluation will not suffice.   Some courts have taken this172
requirement quite literally.173
Other courts have applied the government approval of reasonably precise
specifications element less rigorously.  These courts have required only that
the specifications evaluate the design feature in question; they need not
169. Id.; see also Larry J. Gusman, Note, Rethinking Boyle v. United Technologies Corp.
Government Contractor Defense: Judicial Preemption of the Doctrine of Separation of
Powers?, 39 AM. U. L. REV. 391, 434 (1990) (recommending that defense only apply where
government actually designed and controlled specifications, not simply approved contractor’s
design and specifications). 
170. Kleemann v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 890 F.2d 698, 703 (4th Cir. 1989) (discussing
the design of aircraft landing gear). 
171. Trevino, 865 F.2d at 1489. 
172. Id.
173. Barron v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 868 F. Supp. 1203, 1204 (N.D. Cal. 1994).  The court
found a genuine issue of material fact prevented summary judgment on the government
contractor defense where the plaintiff was exposed to toxic fumes leaking from canisters used
to store surface-to-air missiles.  Id.  The evidence established that the government approved
reasonably precise specifications for the canisters, but it was not clear that these specifications
would require the precise design feature the plaintiff claimed was defective.  Id. at 1206. 
Similarly, in Strickland v. Royal Lubricant Co., 911 F. Supp. 1460 (M.D. Ala. 1995), the court
found that issues of fact precluded summary judgment on the government contractor defense
where the plaintiff alleged injuries from toxic hydraulic fluid used in CH-47 Chinook
helicopters which he accidentally inhaled and swallowed while performing maintenance.  Id.
at 1464.  The court required the government to prospectively limit the discretion of the
contractor so as to preclude the use of the plaintiff’s proposed alternative design.  The
government had tested and approved the hydraulic fluid, finding that it satisfied the
requirements of Military Specification MIL-H-83282 for hydraulic fluids.  Id. at 1467.  The
specifications included twenty-five pages specifying the precise “base stock, additives, oxidation
inhibitors, anti-wear agents, blending fluid, red dye concentration, finished fluid properties,
specific gravity, corrosiveness and oxidation stability, solid particle contamination, foaming
characteristics, flammability, high pressure spray ignition and flame propagation.”  Id.  The
plaintiff, however, alleged that natural Tricresyl Phosphate, rather than a synthetic Tricresyl
Phosphate, would have reduced the fluid’s toxicity.  Id.  Accordingly, the court concluded that
the government specifications did not conflict with the plaintiff’s claims of defect. 
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address the specific defect alleged.   Accordingly, approval of reasonably174
precise government specifications was found where the Navy approved a
contractor’s design for a pilot restraint system that failed and resulted in
pilot deaths.   The Navy was not required to have rejected the plaintiff’s175
proposed alternative safer design, but simply to have approved the
contractor’s design.   Courts have also found government approval of a176
design where the government had long experience with the product and
decided to continue to use the component at issue.177
Accordingly, it appears that the Boyle court adopted the three-part McKay
test without performing a detailed analysis of whether the test was properly
tailored to fit the federal interest the Court sought to protect: the exercise of
governmental discretion in procurement.  Ironically, the Court was critical
of the lower court’s reliance on the Feres doctrine in part because the Court
concluded that the three-part McKay test is inexplicable when applied to a
Feres-based defense, as it would logically preclude all products liability
suits by military members injured incident to service.   While the McKay178
test may be logically inapplicable to a Feres-based defense,  it is no more179
logically applicable to the discretionary function-based defense.  In its
eagerness to reject Feres, the Court failed to consider the logical extensions
of the government contractor defense it adopted to replace the Feres
doctrine.
IV. A Military Contractor Defense
The proposed alternative to the current Boyle government contractor
defense is a “military contractor defense” based upon the constitutional
allocation of control over the military to the political branches of
174. Kerstetter v. Pac. Scientific Co., 210 F.3d 431, 435 (5th Cir. 2000) (discussing pilot
restraint system). 
175. Id. at 438.
176. Id. 
177. Lewis v. Babcock Indus., Inc., 985 F.2d 83, 88 (2d Cir. 1993) (discussing government
reorder of cable used to connect crew ejection module to parachute after it was aware of cable’s
possible failure); Ramey v. Martin-Baker Aircraft Co., 874 F.2d 946 (4th Cir. 1989) (discussing
continued use of ejection system after government was aware of dangers posed to maintenance
personnel); Dowd v. Textron, Inc., 792 F.2d 409, 411 (4th Cir. 1986) (discussing twenty years
of government use of helicopter rotor system) (pre-Boyle decision).
178. Green & Matasar, supra note 28, at 684-85 (discussing gap in coverage between Boyle
Court’s discretionary function rationale and its adoption of McKay test, and noting Court’s
ironic criticism of lower court’s use of Feres-based defense because of similar gap). 
179. While this author agrees with the Court’s conclusion that the McKay test is inapplicable
to a Feres-based defense, it does not logically follow that a Feres-based defense is flawed. 
Rather, it is the McKay test that should have been abandoned. 
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government and the demands of military discipline.  These rationales
provide a more solid foundation for the application of federal common
law.   A defense founded on these federal interests recognizes the180
differences between military procurement and other government
procurement, as well as the differences between lawsuits brought by
civilians and those brought by servicemembers.  
The law has often recognized substantive and procedural differences
between similar claims and the creation of federal common law based upon
these federal interests.   In Boyle, the Court seemed to consciously ignore181
the federal interests in separation of powers in military affairs and in
military discipline that were relied upon as the primary basis for the Feres
doctrine and the pre-Boyle government contractor cases.  The Boyle Court
reached its conclusion because it was focused on the wrong government
interest—fiscal concerns and their impact on government discretion.  Had
the Court focused on the constitutional allocation of military matters to the
political branches of government and the related concern of military
discipline, a different conclusion would have been drawn.  The military
contractor defense proposed here accounts for these interests.  At the same
time, it will be easy to apply and will present clear boundaries for its
application.
Specifically, the proposed military contractor defense would not apply to
claims bought by civilian plaintiffs but would bar all products liability
claims brought by servicemembers injured incident to service, not just
design defect claims arising from government approval of reasonably precise
specifications.  Accordingly, in the context of suits such as Boyle brought by
a servicemember or his beneficiaries, suppliers of military equipment should
be permitted to raise a military contractor defense that would preclude any
damages suit for incident to service injuries based upon state products
liability law.  The defense would not require any finding that the government
approved or specified the design feature at issue.  It would apply equally to
180. An exhaustive critique of the Court’s analysis of the justification for creating federal
common law is beyond the scope of this article.  Furthermore, a scholarly and detailed critique
has already been undertaken by Professors Michael D. Green and Richard A. Matasar, upon
which this author could not improve.  See Green & Matasar, supra note 28.
181. In fact, the same year that Boyle was decided, the Court held as a matter of federal
common law that servicemembers’ Bivens suits are barred in order to prevent judicial
interference in military matters and military discipline.  See United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S.
669, 682 (1987); see also infra Part IV.D.1.  Similarly, whether Feres is viewed as statutory
interpretation of the FTCA—as the Court has treated it—or federal common law, the Court has
clearly stated that it is justified by the constitutional allocation of military matters to the political
branches of government and concerns for military discipline, not merely cost concerns.  See
supra Part II. 
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military equipment purchased off-the-shelf by model number and to
equipment built to precise military specifications. 
The military contractor defense eliminates the three parts of the McKay
test adopted by Boyle because, as the Boyle Court correctly noted, these
criteria are “inexplicable” if the defense is based upon Feres.   This is182
precisely the scope of the defense the Boyle Court rejected as being both too
broad and too narrow.   The Feres-based military contractor defense183
focuses upon military discipline and preventing judicial interference with
military matters.  It is broader in some respects than the test articulated in
Boyle, but not overbroad.  By focusing upon the military rather than the
protection of the government’s fiscal discretion, it avoids the narrowness of
the Boyle defense, which permits servicemember claims that disrupt military
discipline and force judicial interference into military matters
constitutionally reserved to the political branches of government. 
A. The Federal Interests in Military Discipline and the Constitution’s
Allocation of Military Matters to the Political Branches of Government
Provide a Solid Basis for a Federal Common Law Defense Limited to
Military Procurement
Under the Constitution, Congress is expressly vested with the power to
“declare War,”  “raise and support Armies,”  “provide and maintain a184 185
Navy,”  “make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and186
naval Forces,”   “call[] forth the Militia,”  and “provide for organizing,187 188
arming, and disciplining, the Militia.”   The Constitution requires that189
182. Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 510 (1988). 
183. Id. at 510-11; see also Green & Matasar, supra note 28, at 668-69.  Professors Green
and Matasar believe that the Boyle Court’s criticisms of a Feres-based defense are more
properly understood as an indictment of Feres itself.  They maintain that Feres is overbroad to
the extent that it bars claims that pose little threat to its core concerns of military discipline and
deference to military decisionmaking, and that Feres is too narrow because it does not prevent
civilian suits that implicate military discipline and decisionmaking.  Id.  While this author does
not necessarily disagree with their analysis, the same criticism could be leveled at every bright-
line prophylactic rule.  Feres’s potential overbreadth in a given case is justifiable as a necessary
precaution to prevent the disruption of military decisionmaking and discipline that would occur
through the process of a case-by-case evaluation of the potential disruption.  See Stanley, 483
U.S. at 682-83. 
184. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
185. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 12.
186. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 13.
187. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 14.
188. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 15.
189. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 16. 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol60/iss4/1
2007] BOYLE’S GOVERNMENT CONTRACTOR DEFENSE 679
“[t]he President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the
United States, and of the Militia of the several States.”   Congress has190
authorized the President and his subordinates to regulate and direct many
aspects of military affairs.   The Constitution provides little or no role for191
the judiciary in the running of the military,  and the Constitutional192
allocation of powers is always a consideration when courts are called upon
to decide matters relating to the military.193
The Framers of the Constitution knew very well the rigors of military life
and the inescapable demands of military discipline.   Centuries of194
190. Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. 
191. E.g., Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 773-74 (1996) (stating Congress may make
measured and appropriate delegations of its responsibility for task of balancing rights of
servicemen against needs of the military, including delegating to the executive authority to
prescribe aggravating factors that permit a court-martial to impose death penalty). 
192. Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 301 (1983) (“[J]udges are not given the task of
running the Army.” (quoting Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 93 (1953))); see also Luftig
v. McNamara, 373 F.2d 664, 665-66 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (per curiam) (“The fundamental division
of authority and power established by the Constitution precludes judges from overseeing the
conduct of foreign policy or the use and disposition of military power; these matters are plainly
the exclusive province of Congress and the Executive.”). 
193. See, e.g., Chappell, 462 U.S. at 301.
194. Id. at 300.  Twenty-three of the forty signers of the United States Constitution were
veterans of the Revolutionary War, including: George Washington, James McHenry, Alexander
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experience have taught the military establishment that the obedience to
orders imperative in combat can only be developed by requiring immediate
compliance with military procedure and orders—without debate or
reflection—at all times.   Upon enlistment, a citizen’s relation to the state195
and the public are changed and the citizen becomes a soldier.  Once he has
put on his uniform, he cannot, of his own accord, remove it or disregard its
correlative rights and duties.   The Court has described the demands of196
military discipline in the clearest possible terms: “An army is not a
deliberative body.  It is the executive arm.  Its law is that of obedience.  No
question can be left open as to the right to command in the officer, or the
duty of obedience in the soldier.”197
The lives of men in combat and the security of the Nation itself depend
on military discipline and obedience to a command structure.   The need198
for military discipline results from the fact that “it is the primary business
of armies and navies to fight or be ready to fight wars should the occasion
arise.”   To effect this mission, servicemembers must be indoctrinated to199
Hamilton, John Langdon, John Dickinson, Richard Bassett, William Blount, Richard Dobbs
Spaight, Hugh Williamson, Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, Charles Pinckney, Pierce Butler,
William Few, Abraham Baldwin, Nicholas Gilman, Rufus King, William Livingston, David
Brearley, Jonathan Dayton, Thomas Mifflin, Thomas Fitzsimons, William Jackson, and
Gouverneur Morris.  See ROBERT K. WRIGHT, JR. & MORRIS J. MACGREGOR, JR., SOLDIER-
STATESMEN OF THE CONSTITUTION (2004), available at http://www.army.mil/cmh/books/Rev
War/ss/ss-fm.htm.
195. Chappell, 462 U.S. at 300.  In a May 1941 address to the officers and men of the
Second Armored Division, General George S. Patton Jr. made the following statement
describing the importance of military discipline: “You cannot be disciplined in great things and
undisciplined in small things. . . .  Brave, undisciplined men have no chance against the
discipline and valor of other men.”  George S. Patton, Address to the Officers and Men of the
Second Armored Division (May 17, 1941), in THE BOOK OF MILITARY QUOTATIONS 130 (Peter
G. Tsouras ed. 2005) (omission in original).
196. United States v. Grimley, 137 U.S. 147, 153 (1890).  The Court denied the habeas
corpus petition of a forty-year-old man who lied about his age in order to enlist in the Army,
despite the requirement that recruits be between sixteen and thirty-five years old.  Id. at 150. 
He apparently regretted his decision to enlist and deserted, only to be apprehended, court-
martialed and sentenced to six months of imprisonment.  Id. at 149-50.  The petitioner
maintained that his enlistment was void because of his age and, therefore, he never became a
soldier subject to the jurisdiction of a military court-martial.  Id. at 150.  The Court held that its
review was limited to determining the jurisdiction of the court-martial over the petitioner.  Id. 
The Court also held that the age requirement was for the benefit of the government, not the
soldier, and therefore did not void his enlistment.  Id. at 151.  
197. Id. at 153.
198. Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 759 (1974) (citing United States v. Gray, 20 C.M.A. 63
(C.M.A. 1970)). 
199. United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 17 (1955). 
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instant and willing obedience to lawful orders.   But military discipline is200
not just obedience to orders: it more broadly encompasses a common sense
of duty, commitment, unity, honor, esprit de corps, and self-sacrifice.   It201
represents “the subordination of the desires and interests of the individual
to the needs of the service.”   Studies have repeatedly established that202
soldiers in combat risk their lives and fight because they do not want to let
their comrades down.   They can perform their individual tasks because203
they trust their fellow soldiers to do their duty and to “have their back,” so
that the unit functions as a single, reliable whole.   Unit cohesion,204
teamwork, and a can-do attitude are essential to an effective fighting unit.205
The Boyle Court justified the creation of the federal common law defense
on the need to prevent cost increases resulting from judgments against
contractors and the impermissible interference such costs would have on
government discretion in procurement.   Nevertheless, even justified fiscal206
concerns have been deemed insufficient in other contexts to support the
creation of federal common law.   As a defense to products liability claims,207
200. See generally United States v. Calley, 22 C.M.A. 534, 543 (C.M.A. 1973).  In this My
Lai Massacre case, the court commented on the need for obedience to all but the most patently
illegal orders: 
The first duty of a soldier is obedience, and without this there can be neither
discipline nor efficiency in an army.  If every subordinate officer and soldier were
at liberty to question the legality of the orders of the commander, and obey them
or not as they may consider them valid or invalid, the camp would be turned into
a debating school, where the precious moment for action would be wasted in
wordy conflicts between the advocates of conflicting opinions.
Id. (quoting McCall v. McDowell, 15 F. Cas. 1235, 1240 (C.C.D. Cal. 1867) (No. 8673)). 
201. Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 507 (1986).
202. Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 92 (1953). 
203. 2 SAMUEL A. STOUFFER, THE AMERICAN SOLDIER IN WORLD WAR II 136 (1949)
(reporting that, based upon War Department surveys of soldiers, men are motivated to fight by
unit cohesion); LEONARD WONG ET AL., U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE, WHY THEY FIGHT: COMBAT
MOTIVATION IN THE IRAQ WAR (2003), available at http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.
mil/pdffiles/pub179.pdf; see also Robert J. Rielly, Confronting the Tiger: Small Unit Cohesion
in Battle, MIL. REV., Nov.-Dec. 2000, at 61, 62 (discussing instances during World War II in
which soldiers went absent without leave from hospitals while recovering from wounds to rejoin
their units entering combat because they did not want to let their friends down). 
204. WONG ET AL., supra note 203, at 10. 
205. James Griffith, The Army’s New Unit Personnel Replacement and Its Relationship to
Unit Cohesion and Social Support, 1 MIL. PSYCHOL. 17 (1989) (discussing importance of unit
cohesion in combat and Army’s efforts to improve unit cohesion); Rielly, supra note 203, at 61
(stating the most important reason men fight is the bond formed with members of their unit). 
206. Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 511 (1988). 
207. Green & Matasar, supra note 28, at 663 (noting that even in cases where impact on
public fisc is more certain than in Boyle, the Court has found this insufficient federal interest
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this justification—reducing the cost of dangerous products—seems even less
appropriate because it is contrary to the basic principles of strict liability
law.
Strict liability ensures that a product’s price reflects all the product’s
costs by encouraging the manufacturer to factor in the costs of injuries
caused by the product.   The manufacturer and the government—as the208
primary or exclusive consumer of the product—are in the best position to
evaluate the risks and spread the costs of injuries caused by a given design. 
Allowing liability for defective design claims could actually help facilitate
the government’s risk-utility analysis and aid in the informed exercise of
government discretion.   Higher prices, resulting from compensation to209
persons injured by product hazards, would ensure that government officials
balance a product’s utility against all its costs, including the harms it causes. 
The Boyle government contractor defense forces the injured persons to bear
all the expenses of the injuries caused by the product.   These private costs210
are hidden from the government official procuring products because they
will not be reflected in the product’s price.  Accordingly, the government
may unknowingly select a cheaper but more dangerous product.  This is
particularly true outside of military procurement where the unique “trade-off
to warrant adoption of a federal common law rule). 
208. See OWEN, supra note 154, § 5.4; Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution
and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499, 505 (1961). 
209. Green & Matasar, supra note 28, at 718. 
210. See DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 353 (2000) (discussing rationales supporting
strict liability).
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between greater safety and greater combat effectiveness” is not
implicated.211
In contrast, the military contractor defense stands upon a more solid
foundation because it focuses not on cost concerns but upon the
Constitution’s express allocation of the responsibility for equipping the
military to Congress and, through delegation, to the Executive.  In modern
conflicts, military success may depend almost as much upon weapons and
equipment as it depends upon the quality of the servicemembers involved.  212
The importance and the limitations of superior technology and lethality have
become readily apparent during numerous conflicts over the last century and
particularly during the two most recent conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan.213
211. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 511. 
212. Max Boot, The Paradox of Military Technology, NEW ATLANTIS, Fall 2006, at 13
[hereinafter Boot, Paradox], available at http://www.thenewatlantis.com/archive/14/TNA14-
Boot.pdf (discussing how technological superiority has allowed the U.S. military to become the
most powerful military in world history, but correctly noting that superior equipment is
intimately dependant upon high quality long-term professional soldiers rather than short-term
conscripts); see also MAX BOOT, WAR MADE NEW (2006) (discussing how advances in military
technology have shaped course of history). 
213. Boot, Paradox, supra note 212, at 13-14 (noting that while technology and
sophisticated weapon systems have allowed the U.S. military to become the most powerful force
ever, it is still vulnerable to low tech car bombs and high tech terrorist attacks using
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In numerous cases, the Supreme Court has recognized the critical
constitutional separation of powers limitations on the judiciary with regard
to military matters,  including weapons and equipment procurement.  214 215
The Court has even invoked the political question doctrine  to preclude216
judicial review of some military matters.   The political question doctrine217
excludes from judicial review those cases involving policy choices assigned
by the Constitution to Congress or the executive branch for resolution.   In218
Gilligan v. Morgan, a student at Kent State University sought injunctive and
declaratory relief regarding the training and equipping of the Ohio National
Guard after use of the Guard to restore civil order on the Kent State
unconventional tactics and weapons). 
214. See, e.g., Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 304 (1983).
215. Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1 (1973) (finding no justiciable controversy in § 1983
action seeking judicial review of training, weapons, and orders of Ohio National Guard).
216. See Martin H. Redish, Judicial Review and the “Political Question”, 79 NW. U. L. REV.
1031 (1985) (discussing application of doctrine and possible justification for it). 
217. Gilligan, 413 U.S. at 10; see also Louis Henkin, Is There a “Political Question”
Doctrine?, 85 YALE L.J. 597 (1976).  Professor Henkin challenges the basic premise of the
political question doctrine—that there are areas of the Constitution not subject to judicial
interpretation—as being contrary to Marbury v. Madison.  He proposes, as an alternative
explanation for the Court’s deference, an interpretation that the Constitution grants an
affirmative power to a coordinated branch of government without any constitutional limitation. 
Accordingly, the only challenge available to constitutionally permissible action is political.  Id.
at 607-17. 
218. E.g., Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 215 (1974). 
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University campus resulted in injury and death to several students.   The219
suit sought judicial intervention to ensure that the Guard’s training and
equipping fostered the use of nonlethal force, rather than lethal force, where
nonlethal force was sufficient to suppress civilian disorder.   The following220
passage from the opinion explains why the Court concluded that the case
sought the adjudication of a political question, and accordingly, did not
present a justiciable controversy:
It would be difficult to think of a clearer example of the type of
governmental action that was intended by the Constitution to be
left to the political branches directly responsible—as the Judicial
Branch is not—to the electoral process.  Moreover, it is difficult
to conceive of an area of governmental activity in which the
courts have less competence.  The complex, subtle, and
professional decisions as to the composition, training, equipping,
and control of a military force are essentially professional
military judgments, subject always to civilian control of the
Legislative and Executive Branches.  The ultimate responsibility
for these decisions is appropriately vested in branches of the
government which are periodically subject to electoral
accountability.  It is this power of oversight and control of
military force by elected representatives and officials which
underlies our entire constitutional system; the majority opinion
of the Court of Appeals failed to give appropriate weight to this
separation of powers.221
While not often invoking the political question doctrine, the Court has
frequently relied upon the Constitution’s repetitive and occasionally
superfluous allocation of military control to political branches  in refusing222
to interfere with military matters.223
The discretionary function exception adopted by the Boyle Court as the
foundation for the government contractor defense seeks to protect separation
of powers concerns but is not limited to military matters where the
219. Gilligan, 413 U.S. at 3; see also, e.g., Bancoult v. McNamara, 445 F.3d 427, 433 (D.C.
Cir. 2006). 
220. Gilligan, 413 U.S. at 4. 
221. Id. at 10-11. 
222. United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 682 & n.6 (1987) (observing that had the
Constitution not expressly granted Congress power “to make Rules for the Government and
Regulation” of the military, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14, Congress would still have had the
authority under the Necessary and Proper Clause, U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 18).
223. E.g., id. at 682; Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 301 (1983). 
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Constitution has so clearly left little role for the judiciary and no role for
state tort law.  The military contractor defense, however, focuses upon this
specific constitutional allocation of military control to the political branches
of government, rather than the broad discretionary function exception, and
clearly limits the defense to military procurement.
B. The Military Contractor Defense Is Not Limited to Design Defects
from Reasonably Precise Government Specifications
The military contractor defense, based upon the constitutional allocation
of military matters to the political branches of government and the demands
of military discipline, applies the same incident to service test applied in the
Feres doctrine.  This has proven to be a workable test and both the courts
and the military are familiar with its parameters.  The incident to service rule
eliminates the problematic application of the McKay factors and more
accurately reflects the actual procurement process, as well as the realities of
products liability litigation.  
Although the incident to service test was first applied in the Feres
doctrine, it has been applied to preclude constitutional tort claims by
servicemembers as well.  In United States v. Stanley, the Court clearly
articulated how such claims by servicemembers would interfere with
military discipline, even though not all the plaintiff’s claims were directed
against members of the military.   In Stanley, an enlisted serviceman sought224
damages for the effects of lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD) secretly
administered to him without his permission as part of an Army study of its
effects.   Stanley’s complaint included claims against unknown defendants225
that the Court was willing to assume might be civilian employees.  226
Accordingly, the potential interference with the officer-subordinate
relationship and military discipline were not as directly implicated.
Nevertheless, the Court barred Stanley’s claim because of the potential
effects such suits could have on military discipline.   The Court rejected a227
case-by-case analysis in favor of the same incident to service rule applied by
Feres to FTCA claims.   The Court acknowledged that this rule represented228
a “policy judgment” reflecting how “harmful and inappropriate” it found
judicial intrusions upon military discipline.   As the Court explained, a229
case-by-case analysis into whether a particular claim impacts upon military
224. Stanley, 483 U.S. at 682-83.
225. Id. at 671. 
226. Id. at 680. 
227. Id. at 681-83. 
228. Id. at 683-84.
229. Id. at 681. 
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discipline and decisionmaking would itself negatively affect military
discipline:
A test for liability that depends on the extent to which particular
suits would call into question military discipline and
decisionmaking would itself require judicial inquiry into, and
hence intrusion upon, military matters.  Whether a case
implicates those concerns would often be problematic, raising the
prospect of compelled depositions and trial testimony by military
officers concerning the details of their military commands.  Even
putting aside the risk of erroneous judicial conclusions (which
would becloud military decisionmaking), the mere process of
arriving at correct conclusions would disrupt the military regime. 
The “incident to service” test, by contrast, provides a line that is
relatively clear and that can be discerned with less extensive
inquiry into military matters.230
Accordingly, Justice Scalia, writing for the majority of the Court, found
that the potential for interference with military discipline compelled the
Court to deny Stanley’s damages suit because the injury occurred incident
to his military service.   More importantly, the Court adopted a231
prophylactic rule because judicial inquiry into the extent a particular suit
would impede military discipline was itself too destructive of military
discipline.232
Given the rationale and holding in Stanley, it is difficult to understand
why in Boyle the Court failed to apply the Feres and Bivens incident to
service rule to suits by servicemembers against military contractors for
allegations of defectively designed military equipment.  Under Boyle, the
government contractor rule only applies when the United States specifies or
approves reasonably precise design specifications and the equipment
conforms to those specifications.   Yet, ascertaining whether the233
government approved reasonably precise specifications for the design
feature in question will involve depositions and trial testimony by military
officers concerning the details of their military commands, the needs of the
missions, and the trade-off between safety and military effectiveness. 
Military contractors work closely with the military, and in most instances it
will be difficult to criticize the contractor’s design without directly or
230. Id. at 682-83 (emphasis added).
231. Id. at 684.
232. But see generally Kellman, supra note 8 (criticizing Rehnquist Court’s judicial
abdication in civil cases involving military security establishment). 
233. Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500 (1988).
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indirectly criticizing a military decision.   The incident to service rule is234
much better suited to assist in these circumstances.
A similar prophylactic rule is necessary to prevent judicial interference
in military matters constitutionally allocated to the political branches of
government and to prevent the detrimental effect servicemembers’ products
liability lawsuits would have upon military discipline.  Civil litigation for
incident to service injuries is the antithesis of the subordination of self-
interest and desire essential to the needs of the service.  Military discipline
demands that servicemembers push themselves to accomplish their duty
regardless of the hardships and their injuries.  Servicemembers are rewarded
and honored for courage and determination to accomplish their missions
despite the difficulties.  In stark contrast, personal injury litigation creates
perverse incentives for malingering and emphasizes the victim status of the
plaintiff.   Indeed, the process of litigation may exacerbate psychological235
distress and result in “secondary traumatization” that impedes the recovery
process.   Even where a military plaintiff is not exaggerating his disability,236
the defendant’s attorney is likely to seek evidence of malingering through
the deposition testimony of his comrades, commanding officer and military
doctors.  The process of developing this evidence may undermine the
confidence of fellow soldiers in the integrity, honor, and reliability of their
comrades, which in turn could undermine the unit cohesiveness and trust
necessary for combat effectiveness.237
C. The Military Contractor Defense Reflects and Protects the Actual
Procurement Process, Including Commercial Off-the-Shelf Products
Since the Boyle decision, there have been numerous changes to
government acquisition that have implications for the military contractor
defense.  The rapid progress of technology—with private industry at the
cutting edge—now requires streamlined procurement procedures that allow
234. Tozer v. LTV Corp., 792 F.2d 403, 406 (4th Cir. 1986). 
235. See Steven I. Friedland, Law, Science and Malingering, 30 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 337 (1998)
(discussing problem of malingering in personal injury suits, defined as intentional production
of false or exaggerated symptoms for obtaining financial compensation and advocating an
expanded role for experts in detecting malingering). 
236. Edward J. Hickling et al., The Psychological Impact of Litigation: Compensation
Neurosis, Malingering, PTSD, Secondary Traumatization, and Other Lessons from MVAs, 55
DEPAUL L. REV. 617 (2006) (discussing malingering and effects of litigation on plaintiff’s
psychological recovery). 
237. See supra notes 203-05 and accompanying text; see also John L. Watts, To Tell the
Truth: A Qui Tam Action for Perjury in a Civil Proceeding Is Necessary to Protect the Integrity
of the Civil Judicial System, 79 TEMP. L. REV. 773, 779-81 (2006) (discussing erosion of
religious, social, and moral incentives for truthfulness under oath in today’s litigation climate). 
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the military to rapidly incorporate the latest technological innovations.  238
Congress has responded by approving several legislative changes to the
acquisition process.   These changes have implications for the Boyle239
government contractor defense because the government often purchases off-
the-shelf consumer equipment or is otherwise uninvolved in the product’s
design.   Accordingly, the government contractor defense is unavailable for240
many of these products under the Boyle test.
Yet, even where the military purchases a product off-the-shelf and takes
no part in its design, the military may have made numerous decisions that
would be implicated in a servicemember’s products liability suit against the
supplier.  The government may have compared the selected product with
numerous other competitive off-the-shelf products and evaluated and
compared the cost, weight, durability, and safety of the competing products. 
The design feature subject to the servicemember’s claim for defective design
may never have been expressly considered, but allowing such a claim still
involves judicial second-guessing of military matters constitutionally
allocated to the political branches of the government charged with equipping
and running the military.
An example used by the Boyle Court itself seems to justify a broader
application of the defense than the McKay test allows.  The Court noted that
if the government ordered an existing product by model number, such as a
quantity of stock helicopters, the defense would not apply because it would
be “impossible to say that the [g]overnment has a significant interest” in a
particular feature alleged to be defective, because the helicopter’s design
238. See, e.g., Harold Kennedy, Military Procurement Guide Being Revamped, NAT’L DEF.,
July 2000, at 22, available at http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/issues/2000/Jul/
Military_Procurement.htm (discussing changes to Defense Department’s acquisition directives
and instructions to aid in prompt acquisition of advanced technology for troops). 
239. Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-106, 110 Stat. 647 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 41 U.S.C.); Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994, Pub. L. No.
103-335, 108 Stat. 3243 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 10 U.S.C.); see also Jeff
Bingaman, The Origins and Development of the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act, 145 MIL.
L. REV. 149 (1994) (discussing the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994); Ross W.
Branstetter, Acquisition Reform: All Sail and No Rudder, ARMY LAW., Mar. 1998, at 3
(discussing success and failures of the “storm of reform” in government acquisition during
1990s); Robert F. Hedrick, The New Single Process Initiative Threatens to Erode the Boyle
Military Contractor Defense, 24 TRANSP. L.J. 129 (1997). 
240. See Hedrick, supra note 239 (discussing Single Process Initiative, whereby the
contractor can make block changes to existing contracts using commercial practices and
performance standards rather than detailed military specifications, and the government,
accordingly, is often not directly involved in development or approval of design; predicting
government contractor defense frequently will not cover such block changes). 
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was not expressly considered by the government.   Nevertheless, it is241
difficult to understand why the Court’s example should not fall within the
government contractor defense if the defense is principally aimed at
protecting governmental discretion in procurement.  The FTCA
discretionary function exception clearly states that it applies whether the suit
is based upon governmental exercise of discretion or the “failure to exercise
or perform a discretionary function or duty.”   Where the government does242
not specifically approve or specify the design of a product feature alleged to
be defective—for example, purchasing stock helicopters for military use—it
still seems to fit nicely within the language of the discretionary function
exception.243
The decision to purchase helicopters for military use from an existing
stock certainly involves the exercise of discretion or the failure to exercise
that discretion, regardless of the level of government participation in, or
approval of, the design.   In the example used by the Court, the government244
may have made a policy decision to buy stock helicopters based upon the
cost, rapid availability, and track record of commercial success.  This
decision may have been deemed preferable to the alternative of embarking
upon the expensive and time-consuming development of an alternative,
albeit safer and more battlefield-capable, design.  Despite these
considerations, the government contractor defense as formulated by Boyle
does not apply.
Moreover, even where equipment is off-the-shelf and available for
civilian use, military use of the product may involve applications that greatly
increase the potential risk of harm and that are simply not present in civilian
use.  For example, body armor is available on the civilian market for non-
military use.   Many companies market their products to police, security245
241. Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 509, 512 (1988). 
242. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (2000). 
243. See Ronald A. Cass & Clayton P. Gillette, The Government Contractor Defense:
Contractual Allocation of Public Risk, 77 VA. L. REV. 257 (1991) (failure to consider particular
feature does not demonstrate lack of interest but rather a decision that cost of bargaining about
that feature is not warranted). 
244. Green & Matasar, supra note 28, at 692 (“[I]nstances may exist in which the decision
to purchase a stock product is driven by one or more aspects of that product deemed essential
to its military function.”). 
245. Manufacturers include Point Blank Body Armor, Inc., Pompano Beach, Florida
(manufactures current Interceptor body armor used by most U.S. military; also makes many
models of body armor sold to civilians and police); Second Chance Armor, Inc., Central Lake,
Michigan; Pinnacle Armor, Inc., Fresno, California (maker of Dragon Skin, a product that
competes with Point Blank’s Interceptor model); and American Body Armor, Ontario,
California.  For a listing of manufacturers of civilian body armor, see Police Body Armor
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guards, armored car operators and others in need of protection.  These
civilian uses may result in some exposure to liability, but the potential for
liability is greatly increased when the body armor is purchased by the
military and issued to hundreds of thousands of troops exposed to constant
and varied attacks under extreme combat conditions.246
This does not mean that the political branches are not answerable for their
decisions regarding military matters: Congress and the Executive are always
answerable to the People.   Not only are elected officials often voted in or247
out of office based upon their decisions regarding military matters, but
policy regarding military procurement is often changed in response to
political pressure.  For example, recently there have been numerous reports
of servicemembers being injured or killed by shrapnel and bullets piercing
the sides of the torso, an area not protected by the currently issued body
armor.   The resulting media and public outcry has resulted in the military248
purchasing side-protective replacement armor.   Similarly, reports of249
injuries received by troops in inadequately armored Humvees led to
increased armoring of Humvees by government contractors and to the
procurement of vehicles better designed to survive the improvised munitions
explosions prevalent in urban combat in Iraq.   Other cases where the250
judiciary has refused to interfere in military matters, despite the apparent
Company Directory, http://www.policeoneproducts.com/police-products/tactical/body-armor/
manufacturers/ (last visited Jan. 14, 2008).
246. Because of safety concerns, the Army and Marine Corps recently banned troops from
wearing off-the-shelf body armor purchased at the soldier’s own expense, commonly Pinnacle
Armor, Inc.’s Dragon Skin, instead of the military issued product.  John Hoellwarth, Corps Bans
Off-the-Shelf Body Armor, MARINE CORPS TIMES, Apr. 23, 2007, http://www.marinecorpstimes.
com/news/2007/04/marine_bodyarmor_ban_070419/. 
247. E.g., Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 302 (1983) (national defense and military
affairs are constitutionally left to political branches directly responsible to the electoral process). 
248. See, e.g., Michael Moss, Pentagon Acts on Body Armor, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2006, at
A6 (reporting Pentagon study indicated as many as eighty percent of Marines who died in Iraq
of upper body wounds could have been saved by side armor protection).
249. Joe Pappalardo, Researchers, Manufacturers Search for Better Body Armor, NAT’L
DEF., Aug. 2004, at 46, available at http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/issues/2004/
Aug/Researchers.htm (discussing problems with Interceptor vests’ lack of side coverage and
rapid acquisition of armor protection enhancement systems to help provide additional
protection); Christian Lowe, Army Fields New Body Armor Design (Apr. 3, 2007), http://www.
military.com/NewsContent/0,13319,130937,00.html (discussing Improved Outer Tactical Vest’s
advantages over prior Interceptor vest, including increased coverage and lighter weight). 
250. See, e.g., W. Thomas Smith, Jr., The “Ultimate Betrayal”?: Humvee Realities, NAT’L
REV. ONLINE, Dec. 21, 2005, http://www.nationalreview.com/smitht/smith200512210805.asp
(discussing development of armored Humvee and other more heavily armored vehicles,
including the Buffalo and the Cougar). 
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injustices and poor judgment of the political branches, have also resulted in
policy changes driven by political pressure.251
The military contractor defense would not be limited to the weapons of
war.   All military equipment providers would be protected by the defense,252
as long as the plaintiff was a military member injured incident to service. 
An army travels on its stomach,  and a soldier is just as dependant on his253
food, boots, and poncho to accomplish his mission as he is on his rifle,
ammunition, and radio.  If such distinctions were allowed, the line between
military equipment and non-military equipment used by the military would
251. In Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 507 (1986), the Court held that the
Constitution’s Free Exercise Clause did not require that the Air Force allow an orthodox Jewish
officer to wear a yarmulke with his uniform.  In refusing to interfere with military regulations,
the Court noted that the judiciary is “ill-equipped” to assess the needs of military discipline and
that the judiciary must show great deference to the political branches constitutionally authorized
to determine appropriate military policy.  Id. at 507-08.  Congress responded by enacting
legislation that allows the wearing of “an item of religious apparel” with a military uniform
unless it “would interfere with the performance of the member’s military duties” or is not “neat
and conservative.”  10 U.S.C. § 774(a)-(b) (2000).  Similarly, the courts refused to interfere with
military policy that required inductees into the military to answer questions about their sexual
orientation before being allowed to enter the Armed Forces.  See, e.g., Rich v. Sec’y of Army,
735 F.2d 1220, 1223 (10th Cir. 1984) (dismissing medical specialist from the Army under Army
Reg. 635-200, ch. 14 (1973) for fraudulent enlistment because he represented on reenlistment
forms that he was not a homosexual but later admitted that he was).  In response to considerable
pressure from the press, the public, and President Bill Clinton, Congress enacted legislation
implementing the “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy that precludes questioning applicants about their
sexual orientation or conduct.  See Chad C. Carter & Antony Barone Kolenc, “Don’t Ask, Don’t
Tell:” Has the Policy Met Its Goals?, 31 U. DAYTON L. REV. 1 (2005) (discussing the
development of “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy and continuing controversy surrounding it). 
252. See Green & Matasar, supra note 28, at 691 (criticizing Boyle Court for failing to
explain why government contractor defense applies to “guns, but not butter”).  But see Cass &
Gillette, supra note 243 (maintaining that whether immunity should be extended to government
contractor should depend upon nature of product or service contracted for).  Dean Cass and
Professor Gillette would distinguish between off-the-shelf products already available in the
unregulated civilian market and goods that have a unique military use.  They maintain normal
tort rules should apply to the commercially available off-the-shelf products because the
contractor is already facing liability for the product sold in the private sector.  As to unique
military products, immunity might be appropriate to ensure willing producers at acceptable
prices.  Id. at 276-320.  While their article is very thoughtful, it assumes that military use of a
civilian product will not greatly increase the contractor’s exposure to liability.  As explained
above, this author does not accept this premise.  More importantly, Dean Cass and Professor
Gillette fail to give sufficient weight to the effect litigation has upon military discipline and the
constitutional allocation of military matters to the political branches of government. 
253. Press Release, Mary Mott, Dep’t of the U.S. Army, Dining Facility Boosts Soldier
Morale in Iraq (Oct. 24, 2006), available at http://www.trackpads.com/magazine/publish/
article_1807.shtml (crediting Napoleon Bonaparte with originating classic statement on
importance of supply lines). 
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be an issue likely to be challenged and litigated in many cases.   It is the254
litigation process itself—and servicemembers invoking that process for
incident to service injuries—that must be avoided to protect the federal
interest in military discipline.  All claims that require testimony from
servicemembers undermine military discipline, whether the controversy
involves E. coli infections caused by poor field mess conditions or a
contractor’s contaminated canning facility, or a rifle malfunction caused by
poor military maintenance or poor contractor design.
Whether the claim involves an unreasonably dangerous design selected by
the military or military equipment purchased off-the-shelf from an existing
supply, the judiciary should not invite juries to second-guess military
decisions that rest on difficult trade-offs balancing mission effectiveness and
safety considerations.   Often the proposed reasonable alternative designs255
required in products liability cases are the designs of existing competing
products.   The discovery of the military’s decisionmaking process in256
choosing between two available products—common in products liability
suits—increases the likelihood that military discipline will be directly
implicated, every bit as much as Bivens actions.  Further, in many products
liability claims the defendant will seek to reduce or avoid liability by proving
product modification or misuse by the plaintiff or a third party.   In the257
military context this will necessarily involve discovery of product
maintenance, training, modification, application, and use—all directly
implicating the military decisions of superiors.
Similarly, products liability claims brought by members of the Armed
Forces injured incident to service may undermine military discipline
regardless of the government’s role in approving the design.  The very act
of bringing the suit necessarily challenges the government’s decision to
equip the military with the product.  Much of the discovery process will
involve review of government documents and the testimony of government
employees to determine the level of government involvement in the design
254. See, e.g., McKay v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 704 F.2d 444, 451 (9th Cir. 1983) (without
defining the term “military equipment,” the court notes that the term lies somewhere between
a can of beans and a reconnaissance aircraft). 
255. See, e.g., Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 511 (1988); Tozer v. LTV Corp.,
792 F.2d 403, 406 (4th Cir. 1986). 
256. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2(b) (1998) (requiring that plaintiff
present evidence of reasonable alternative design in order to establish design defect); Harvey
S. Perlman, Delaware and the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability, 2 DEL. L. REV.
179, 196 (1999) (discussing option of presenting design of existing competitor’s product as
reasonable alternative design). 
257. See OWEN, supra note 154, § 13.5 (discussing defenses to products liability claims). 
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or approval of the design.   As the Court observed in Stanley, the mere258
process of arriving at correct conclusions would disrupt military
discipline.   Government employees will be required to testify as to the259
extent of their consideration of the particular product feature at issue in the
litigation.  If the government approved the defective design, the claim is
barred under Boyle; however, even the process of reaching this decision
necessarily involves questioning the wisdom of that approval by one subject
to military discipline.  A case-by-case inquiry into the government’s
decision to procure the product, as is required under Boyle, always has the
potential to adversely impact military discipline.
Under Boyle, if the court determines that the government did not specify
or approve the allegedly defective design, then the suit is permitted to
proceed.  Although the suit is brought against a private manufacturer, such
a suit will still often require detailed inquiry into the conduct of the
servicemember, his comrades, his superiors, and the military as a whole.  In
most jurisdictions the plaintiff’s recovery is reduced or precluded by his
comparative fault or misuse of the product.   Establishing misuse of the260
product will require inquiry into the sufficiency and competency of military
training and the conduct of the plaintiff or his fellow soldiers.  For example,
if a soldier’s hand is injured in an allegedly premature explosion of a
diversionary hand grenade due to an allegedly defective delay fuse
assembly, the defense is likely to contend that the soldier misused the
grenade.   His fellow soldiers and the military personnel who investigated261
the accident will be questioned:  Was the soldier properly trained in the use262
of the grenade; had the soldier removed the grenade safety pin at the time of
the explosion; how was the grenade carried on the soldier’s combat vest;
could the pin have been inadvertently pulled when the grenade was removed
from the vest?
258. See, e.g., Tate v. Boeing Helicopters, 55 F.3d 1150, 1155 (6th Cir. 1995) (discussing
development of design for hook and sling system used for lifting heavy loads on military
helicopters). 
259. United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 682-83 (1987). 
260. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 17 (1998); OWEN, supra note 154,
§ 13.5.
261. See Jorden v. Ensign-Bickford Co., 20 S.W.3d 847, 855 (Tex. App. 2000) (defendant
maintained that misuse or alteration of diversionary grenade it manufactured was cause-in-fact
of Army sergeant’s injuries received when grenade prematurely exploded). 
262. See Szigedi v. Ensign-Bickford Co., No. 1:00CV00836, 2002 WL 32086774, at *3-4
(M.D.N.C. July 15, 2002) (after Army Master Sergeant special forces team leader sued for
injuries incurred when a diversionary grenade prematurely exploded due to alleged product
defect, defendant deposed plaintiff, special forces team members, and Army investigators in an
effort to establish that grenade pin was removed or grenade was otherwise misused or altered). 
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Such testimony forces soldiers to question the judgment and actions of
their comrades and superiors at the insistence of another soldier.  This is
contrary to all of their military training.  Soldiers are trained to trust their
comrades and follow the orders of their superiors—without second-guessing
their decisions.  In the context of products liability litigation, however,
soldiers are encouraged to doubt the abilities of their comrades, the quality
of their training, and the judgment of their superiors.
Other issues will also arise in litigation that will require the questioning
of military practices, procedures, training, and judgment.  Product
manufacturers are only liable for defects in the product that existed at the
time of sale.   Consequently, one of the issues often litigated is the extent263
to which the product was modified after the sale.   Discovery and264
testimony on this issue will force military personnel to testify as to their
training, maintenance, and modification of equipment: Was a warning on the
product painted over by the military when changing from woodland to desert
camouflage; was a safety device disabled because it interfered with the
combat effectiveness of the equipment; who ordered it to be disabled; were
the actions of that soldier authorized by military regulations and superior
orders; was the order lawful?
The military contractor defense, by precluding all suits by
servicemembers injured by allegedly defective products incident to service,
would provide a clear line of demarcation with little inquiry into military
matters and even less disruption to military discipline.   It is a rule that265
respects the unique disciplinary structure and culture of the military and the
Constitution’s express and specific allocation of military affairs to the
political branches of government, and cautions against judicial second-
guessing of military decisionmaking.  The military contractor defense
incorporates these considerations and provides a defense with a logical
scope to preserve them.
D. The Military Contractor Defense Distinguishes Between Civilian and
Military Plaintiffs
The Boyle court reasoned that the government contractor defense should
apply to both civilian and servicemember claims because both suits could
indirectly increase procurement costs that might interfere with government
263. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A(1)(b) (1965); OWEN, supra note 154, § 5.3. 
264. Jorden, 20 S.W.3d at 855 (defendant suggested that diversionary grenade could have
been altered after delivery to military because “ready tent” where grenades and weapons were
stored was left unguarded fifteen hours a day).
265. See United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 683 (1987) (discussing incident to service
test in context of servicemember’s Bivens claim). 
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discretion.   This rationale, however, fails to recognize the important266
differences between civilians and servicemembers that have often provided the
basis for distinct substantive and procedural rules.
1. The Differences Between Soldiers and Civilians
Congress has exercised its constitutional authority for plenary control over
the military by establishing the Uniform Code of Military Justice,  a distinct267
system of justice applicable only to those serving in the Armed Forces.   This268
system functions without many of the procedural protections constitutionally
required for the prosecution of civilians in Article III Courts, including the Fifth
Amendment right to a grand jury and the Sixth Amendment right of trial by
jury.  Members of the Armed Forces are subject to this unique system of269
justice even for crimes unrelated to their military service.   The judiciary may270
inquire into the jurisdiction of military courts-martial and the constitutionality
of court-martial actions, but the judiciary does not interfere with military justice
when jurisdiction is proper and the action is constitutionally permissible.   This271
distinct system of justice is necessary because the military is a specialized
community governed by a doctrine of discipline separate from that of civilian
life.   “[T]he rights of men in the armed forces must perforce be conditioned272
to meet certain overriding demands of discipline and duty, and the civil courts
are not the agencies which must determine the precise balance to be struck in
this adjustment.  The Framers expressly entrusted that task to Congress.”273
This fundamental necessity for military discipline “may render permissible
within the military that which would be constitutionally impermissible outside
it.”   The unique requirements of military discipline and the separation of274
powers in military matters have been held sufficiently important to justify
limitations on military members’ basic constitutional and legal rights, including
266. Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 511-12 (1988). 
267. 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-946 (2000). 
268. Id. § 802; see also Gosa v. Mayden, 413 U.S. 665, 673 (1973) (plurality opinion). 
269. Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435, 450 (1987) (upholding court-martial
jurisdiction, without Fifth Amendment’s right to grand jury and Sixth Amendment’s jury trial
requirement, over members of Armed Services at time of offense charged even where crime not
connected to military service). 
270. Id. (overruling O’Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258 (1969)).  O’Callahan limited
military tribunal jurisdiction to crimes with service connection. 
271. United States v. Grimley, 137 U.S. 147 (1890). 
272. Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 301 (1983) (quoting Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S.
83, 93-94 (1953)). 
273. Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 140 (1953) (plurality opinion) (footnote omitted).
274. Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 758 (1974).
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fundamental rights such as freedom of speech  and the free exercise of275
religion.   Servicemembers are, as a matter of law, subject to stricter discipline276
and have less freedom than civilians.  As just one example, most civilians are at-
will employees.  Civilians are free to quit their jobs without giving any notice
and for any reason.   If a civilian refuses to do what his employer tells him to277
do, he may receive a poor raise or performance evaluation, or perhaps lose his
job.  Even contract employees are, at most, subject to civil damages for
breaching their employment contracts.   Servicemembers, however, are subject278
to criminal conviction and imprisonment for desertion if they refuse to honor
275. Id.  The Court upheld the court-martial conviction and sentencing of an Army physician
who urged African-American soldiers to refuse to fight in Vietnam because they were denied
their constitutional rights in the United States and because the war was unjust.  He was
convicted of, among other charges, conduct unbecoming an officer and conduct to the prejudice
of good order and discipline under the Uniform Code of Military Justice.  See generally
Kellman, supra note 8 (criticizing Rehnquist Court for abdicating its responsibility to review
civil claims involving military matters). 
276. Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 507 (1986) (Air Force regulations may preclude
wearing of yarmulke despite servicemember’s religious beliefs), superseded by statute, 10
U.S.C. § 774(b) (2000); United States v. Burry, 36 C.M.R. 829, 831 (C.G.B.R. 1966) (holding
soldier may be ordered to work on Sabbath); United States v. Chadwell, 36 C.M.R. 741, 749-50
(N.B.R. 1965) (holding constitutional protection not extended to servicemembers’ refusal, on
religious grounds, to obey a legal and necessary order to receive inoculations); see also Thomas
R. Folk, The Military, Religion, and Judicial Review: The Supreme Court’s Decision in
Goldman v. Weinberger, ARMY LAW., Nov. 1986, at 5. 
277. See PAUL WEILER, GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE 89-104 (1990) (discussing mutual lack
of obligation in at-will employment where employee can quit at any time and for any reason,
and employer can fire employee at any time and for any reason). 
278. See, e.g., Handicapped Children’s Educ. Bd. of Sheboygan County v. Lukaszewski, 332
N.W.2d 774, 779 (Wis. 1983) (ordering employee to pay damages employer incurred to find her
replacement when she quit in violation of her contract). 
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their contracts.   If a soldier fails to follow a lawful order he is subject to279
prosecution, imprisonment, or—in cases of desertion in time of war—
execution.   Civilians can protest the United States’ decision to wage war or280
the way in which it is being conducted, whereas the same conduct by a soldier
may subject him to discipline and punishment.281
279. United States v. Grimley, 137 U.S. 147 (1890) (denying habeas corpus petition of forty-
year-old man convicted of desertion by military court-martial, although he lied about his age at
time of enlistment in order to circumvent thirty-five-year maximum age limit; enlistment not
voided by his deceit and defendant subject to exclusive jurisdiction of court-martial). 
280. 10 U.S.C. § 885 (2000).  On January 31, 1945, Army private Edward Slovik was
executed by firing squad for desertion during World War II.  Private Slovik was the last soldier
executed for desertion, but the penalty of death remains available for the crime of desertion in
time of war.  See generally WILLIAM BRADFORD HUIE, THE EXECUTION OF PRIVATE SLOVIK
(1954); Scott Sylkatis, Sentencing Disparity in Desertion and Absent Without Leave Trials:
Advocating a Return of “Uniform” to the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 25 QUINNIPIAC L.
REV. 401 (2006) (discussing wide range of punishments authorized for crimes of desertion and
absent without leave under Uniform Code of Military Justice, and proposing return to
sentencing uniformity to ensure sentencing abuses and disparate treatment of similar cases do
not occur). 
281. See Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974) (denying habeas relief to Army doctor court-
martialed and sentenced to three years hard labor for telling enlisted African-American soldiers
that they should refuse to go to Vietnam because they were denied their freedom at home). 
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The Feres doctrine precludes members of the military from bringing claims
for injuries they receive incident to their military service.   These suits are282
precluded because allowing military members to question the decisions of other
military and government employees could “undermine the commitment essential
to effective service and . . . disrupt military discipline in the broadest sense of
the word.”   While civilians may bring civil actions seeking damages from283
federal government actors who violate their constitutional rights,  members of284
the Armed Forces may not.   The Court has refused to entertain285
servicemembers’ claims seeking money damages for constitutional violation
against both military  and civil  superiors where such claims might interfere286 287
with the political branch’s military decisions.288
 To the extent that civilian claims arise from injuries caused by military
equipment, such cases could implicate military discipline, but not to the same
extent as those brought by servicemembers themselves.   Moreover, there are289
additional policy reasons for allowing such claims even where the same claims
would be precluded if brought by military members.  These are the same
rationales articulated by the Court in Johnson and Feres, including the lack of
alternative compensation for civilian plaintiffs and the fact that civilian plaintiffs
do not assume the risks associated with military activities, as do military
personnel.
2. Fundamental Fairness Requires that the Military Contractor Defense
Not Apply to Civilian Claims
282. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950). 
283. United States v. Johnson, 481 U.S. 681, 691 (1987) (applying Feres doctrine but
clarifying military discipline and separation of powers with regard to military matters as primary
rationales justifying doctrine). 
284. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388
(1971) (recognizing cause of action for damages for violation of Fourth Amendment protections
against unreasonable searches and seizures by federal agents). 
285. United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 681 (1987); Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296
(1983). 
286. Chappell, 462 U.S. at 305 (holding that enlisted military personnel may not bring a
damages suit against superior officers for alleged constitutionally prohibited racial
discrimination). 
287. Stanley, 483 U.S. at 683-84.  The plaintiff alleged that without his consent or
knowledge he had been given lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD) as part of a secret Army study
of the effects of the drug on humans.  Id. at 671.  The Court held that no damages remedy was
available, even as to constitutional claims not involving an officer-subordinate relationship, if
the injury arose out of incident to service activity.  Id. at 684. 
288. Although suits for monetary damages are not allowed, the Court may enjoin ongoing
constitutional violations.  Id. at 691 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
289. See supra notes 282-83 and accompanying text.
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Civilians are occasionally injured or killed as a result of allegedly defectively
designed military equipment.  Unlike military members, civilians are not
compensated through any military or veterans’ benefits.  In the absence of a civil
suit, civilians may well be left without any compensation for their injuries. 
Civilians may sue under the FTCA if there was negligence on the part of a
government employee, but this claim will be barred if the government’s
negligence involves decisions protected under the Boyle discretionary function
exception.   It is unnecessarily harsh to deny all compensation to civilians290
injured because of dangerous military equipment.   While we all enjoy the291
benefits of our nation’s military superiority, Boyle forces the injured civilian to
bear a grossly disproportionate share of the costs of equipping the military. 
Allowing civilian suits might increase the cost of military equipment purchased
by the government, but it is not unduly burdensome to have the taxpayers as a
whole pay the cost, rather than the unfortunate injured civilian.292
Some will object to the application of Feres’s incident to service rule to the
military contractor defense because it will result in the denial of tort
compensation to servicemembers who have made personal sacrifices while
serving the United States.  Unlike civilians, however, servicemembers will
receive compensation for incident to service injuries caused by defective
equipment through their extensive military and veterans’ benefits; therefore,
their exclusion under the military contractor defense does not impact them as
290. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (2000); Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500 (1988). 
291. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 515-17 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (discussing unfairness of rule that
denies compensation available under state tort law to military personnel and to civilians lacking
other sources of compensation who are injured by contractor’s negligent design).
292. See generally Virginia E. Nolan & Edmund Ursin, Enterprise Liability and the
Economic Analysis of Tort Law, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 835 (1996) (discussing theory, history and
development of strict products liability, including policies of victim compensation and loss
spreading). 
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harshly.   Tort law generally provides compensation for past and future293
medical expenses, lost wages, and pain and suffering.   With regard to each of294
these categories of damages, servicemembers either receive some compensation
outside of the tort system or are otherwise not as harshly impacted as civilians
by the denial of a tort claim.
Unlike most civilians, all servicemembers receive free medical care.   While295
many civilians have some form of health insurance, they must pay premiums for
it and incur some out-of-pocket expenses for deductibles and co-payments.  296
If civilians recover damages in a tort claim for medical expenses paid by their
healthcare, they often must reimburse their health insurance carrier through
subrogation provisions in their insurance policies.   Civilians injured by297
accidents involving military equipment who are unable to return to work may
qualify for some benefits through Social Security, but these do not approach the
military benefits available to servicemembers.  In contrast, military members
permanently unable to resume their military duties because of incident to service
injuries will be discharged with lifetime disability pay and free medical care at
veterans’ hospitals.298
It is true that the military contractor defense would deny military members the
potentially large pecuniary awards for pain and suffering allowable under most
state tort laws.  However, these damages are, at least in part, consumed by the
transactional cost of attorney fees and litigation expenses.  Almost all products
293. See, e.g., Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 140 (1950) (discussing broad package
of benefits available to servicemembers and their families); see also CHRISTOPHER P. MICHEL,
THE MILITARY ADVANTAGE (2006). 
294. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 905-906 (1965). 
295. All active duty personnel receive free healthcare through the TRICARE system. 
Additionally, dependants and retirees have the choice of three healthcare plans that best fit their
needs.  Your TRICARE Benefits Explained, http://www.military.com/benefits/tricare/under
standing-your-tricare-benefits (last visited Jan. 14, 2008). 
296. According to the U.S. Census Bureau, 15.9 percent of the population—46.6 million
Americans—have no health insurance.  Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau, Income Climbs,
Poverty Stabilizes, Uninsured Rate Increases (Aug. 29, 2006), available at http://www.census.
gov/Press-Release/www/releases/archives/income_wealth/007419.html.  Of those with health
insurance through their employment, workers pay an average of $2064 annually in premiums
in addition to the $7080 contributed by their employers.  TOWERS PERRIN, 2008 HEALTH CARE
COST SURVEY 1 (2007), available at http://www.towersperrin.com/tp/getwebcachedoc?webc=
HRS/USA/2008/200801/hccs_2008.pdf.
297. See Paul R. Thomson III, Note, A Subrogation Clause in a Health Insurance Policy Is
Enforceable Even Though the Insured Has Not Been Made Whole: Higginbotham v. Arkansas
Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 312 Ark. 199 (1993),16 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 475 (1994)
(discussing health insurance subrogation generally, as well as its sometimes harsh consequences
on tort compensation for injured parties). 
298. 10 U.S.C. § 1201 (2000) (retirement or separation for physical disability); 38 U.S.C.
§ 1110 (wartime disability compensation); id. § 1131 (peacetime disability compensation). 
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liability suits are handled on a contingency fee basis, commonly in the thirty-
three percent to forty percent range.   Moreover, the expenses associated with299
litigating a products liability claim can be tremendous.   Consequently, a large300
pain and suffering award often proves not to be as large as it first appears.
Military members’ benefits do not include compensation for pain and
suffering, but military members are honored by society for their sacrifice in the
service of their country.  While some may scoff at this intangible form of
compensation, it is valuable to many, if not all, of the veterans who bear the
physical marks and scars of their service.301
In addition, civilians do not  agree to assume the risks of military activities as
do the members of our all-volunteer military.   Every member of the military302
299. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.5(a), (c) (2006) (allowing
contingency fee agreements so long as charge does not result in “unreasonable fee”); see also
Lester Brickman, Contingency Fee Abuses, Ethical Mandates, and the Disciplinary System: The
Case Against Case-by-Case Enforcement, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1339 (1996) (criticizing
ABA for rarely finding contingency fee contracts unreasonable, even when case involves little
risk or work for attorney). 
300. Richard L. Cupp, Jr., Believing in Products Liability: Reflections on Daubert, Doctrinal
Evolution, and David Owen’s Products Liability Law, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 511, 518-19
(2006) (discussing tremendous expenses associated with expert witnesses, particularly given
alternative reasonable design requirement of Restatement (Third) of Torts). 
301. It is not hard to imagine that a person injured from military equipment during training
or combat might feel less shame, humiliation, and loss than a person similarly injured by a
defective lawn mower, golf cart, or wood chipper.  Certainly, it makes for a better story to tell
friends, future employers or grandchildren.  Consider two candidates for office, one who lost
his arm ejecting from his military aircraft and the other who lost his arm when it was caught in
a wood chipper.  One will be regarded as a hero, the other as careless, regardless of the success
of his products liability claim against the manufacturer of the chipper.
302. The United States has relied upon an all-volunteer force since the draft was eliminated
in 1973.  According to many experts, the all-volunteer force is better-educated, more intelligent,
dedicated, and professional, and more representative of the population as a whole than was the
conscripted military.  See, e.g., BERNARD ROSTKER, I WANT YOU!: THE EVOLUTION OF THE ALL-
VOLUNTEER FORCE (2006).  However, some believe that there are benefits to a draft. 
Congressman Charles Rangel has introduced legislation to renew the draft in order to ensure
sufficient troops for a military overtaxed by the demands of prolonged deployments in Iraq and
Afghanistan.  He also believes a draft is necessary to ensure that the entire nation—including
the sons and daughters of elected officials, and not just lower socio-economic class
members—faces the possibility of service and sacrifice when the country goes to war.  See Press
Release, Congressman Charles Rangel, Congressman Charles Rangel Renews Call for Military
Draft (May 26, 2005), available at http://www.house.gov/list/press/ny15_rangel/CBRStatement
Draft05262005.html.  In the event that a draft is reinstated, it would not affect the proposed
scope of the military contractor defense.  Although conscripted members of the military would
not have voluntarily assumed the risks of military service, their loss of the right to sue military
contractors seems minor when compared with the other restrictions on their freedoms and rights
that accompany conscripted military service. 
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presumably understood the risks associated with military service when they
volunteered.  In most jurisdictions, products liability law recognizes assumption
of the risk as either a complete bar to recovery or as a factor that reduces
recovery.   The concept of assumption of the risk supports common law303
doctrines such as the Fireman’s Rule, which precludes suits by firefighters,
police officers, and others who are injured in the course of confronting dangers
inherent in their employment.   While this rule was originally limited to304
premises claims, it has been expanded to bar even products liability claims by
firefighters injured fighting fires caused by a defective product.   The dangers305
of fighting fires are risks the firefighter undertakes as an inherent part of that
employment.  Members of the public injured in such fires are free to bring
claims for their injuries because they did not undertake the risk.  The same
rationale supports a distinction permitting claims by civilians injured by
defective military equipment while barring claims by military members who
assume these risks as part of their military service.
Similarly, civilians injured within the scope of their employment are often
precluded from suing their employer and others deemed to be statutory
employers under state workers’ compensation statutes.   Statutory employers306
include those subcontractors that perform work which is a part of the employer’s
business.   While this bar is seldom applied to products liability claims, it is not307
difficult to conceive of military equipment suppliers as subcontractors
performing work which is part of the business of the military.  To the extent that
servicemembers receive benefits similar or superior to workers’ compensation
benefits, the bar to suits against military contractors is similar to the preclusive
effect of state workers’ compensation statutes.308
Finally, civilian suits are not likely to seriously impact the government’s
ability to purchase the military equipment it needs to perform the military’s
important functions.  Civilians are less likely to be injured by military
equipment than are military members, by virtue of exposure to the danger alone. 
Even if civilian claims increase the cost of military equipment, the cost increases
can be spread to all taxpayers and should not adversely impact the ability of the
government to acquire the equipment it needs.
303. OWEN, supra note 154, § 13.4 (discussing application of assumption of risk to products
liability law). 
304. DOBBS, supra note 210, § 285 (discussing scope and theory of Firefighters Rule and
concluding that most plausible rationale is based upon assumption of risk principles). 
305. Id. § 278 (listing cases). 
306. ARTHUR LARSON & LEX K. LARSON, LARSON’S WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW §
111.04 (2000) (discussing statutory employers’ immunity). 
307. Id. 
308. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 481 U.S. 681, 690 (noting injured servicemembers
receive benefits that compare favorably to workers’ compensation schemes). 
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V. Conclusion
There are important differences between servicemember and civilian
plaintiffs and military and non-military procurement, but Boyle fails to make
necessary and useful distinctions recognizing these differences.  The
government contractor defense approved by the Court in Boyle separated the
defense from its military mooring and created a split in the lower courts
regarding the scope of the defense.  Tethered only by the broad discretionary
function, Boyle expanded the application of the government contractor defense
and created a logical incongruity between the broad rationale and the limiting
test approved by the Supreme Court.  This incongruity has led to disagreement
in the lower federal courts as to the proper scope of the defense and has resulted
in a divide between the goals of the defense and the realities of modern military
procurement.
Ultimately, the Court must clarify the scope of the government contractor
defense to allow its consistent and straightforward application.  The military is
constitutionally and fundamentally different from civilian society, and the Court
must recognize those differences by making distinctions between civilian and
military plaintiffs and the procurement of military and non-military products. 
The military contractor defense provides a strong basis for the creation of
federal common law, results in a defense that reflects the actual procurement
process, and eliminates the current split in the courts by providing a clear and
logical scope to the defense. 
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